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INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads today as it
did when it was ratified on December 15, 1791.1
So wrote the District Court on its way to upholding laws that effec-
tively prohibited the practice of the Santeria religion within the City of
Hialeah, Florida. The statement is uncontroversial enough. From the
beginning, eighteenth-century interpretations of the First Amendment
have guided the jurisprudence of religious liberty. 2 In Reynolds v. United
I Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1482 (S.D. Fla.
1989), aftfd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
2 The following are only a small sample of Supreme Court opinions that look to the Founders,
particularly Jefferson and Madison, for the original intent behind the religion clauses: County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 671 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(citing George Washington's Thanksgiving Proclamations); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
605-06 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli-
gious Assessments and Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom); McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618, 624 (1978) (Madison's writings); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 383 n.4 (1975) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring and dissenting) (Memorial and Remonstrance); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973) (Memorial and Remonstrance); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (Memorial and Remonstrance); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
633-34 (1971) (Memorial and Remonstrance); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (Jef-
ferson's writings, Memorial and Remonstrance); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213
(1963) (writings of Madison, Jefferson, and Roger Williams); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
430 (1961) (Memorial and Remonstrance); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961) (Jefferson's
letter to Danbury Baptist Association); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
211 (1948) (Danbury Letter); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1947) (Memorial and
Remonstrance, Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Jefferson's writings); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
594 n.3 (1940) (writings of Jefferson and Madison).
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States,3 the first case to consider religious exemptions from generally ap-
plicable laws, Chief Justice Waite cited Thomas Jefferson's famous
"Danbury Letter" as being "almost... an authoritative declaration of
the scope and effect of the [religion clauses]." '4
Even when not explicitly invoking the assistance of the Founders,
the Supreme Court nonetheless looks to eighteenth-century interpreta-
tions of the Free Exercise Clause. For example, in Employment Division
v. Smith,5 the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt
Native American religious ceremonies from a state law prohibiting the
use of peyote. 6 Justice Scalia rooted his interpretation of the Free Exer-
cise Clause in the 1878 opinion of Chief Justice Waite-who in turn re-
lied on Madison and Jefferson. 7
In fact, the available evidence supports the view that the Founders
did not anticipate the need for religious exemptions from generally appli-
cable laws.8 At most, the Free Exercise Clause prevented the federal
government from passing laws targeting religion qua religion. 9 Accord-
ingly, if we look for guidance in the writings of the Founders, Smith's
rejection of an exemption for the Native American Church seems to be
on solid historical ground.
3 98 U.S. 145 (1879). In Reynolds, the Supreme Court rejected a Mormon's free exercise claim
to practice polygamy in contravention of federal law.
4 Id. at 164 (citing Thomas Jefferson's letter to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Associa-
tion (Jan. 1, 1802)).
5 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6 Although the Smith decision has its supporters, see, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of
Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHi. L. REv. 308, 309 (1991), the general response
among scholars has been one of dismay, see John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying
the Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REv. 71 (1991); James D.
Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revision-
ism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1124 (1990). In late 1993, Congress gave its
response to Smith by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141,
107 Stat. 1488 (1993), which requires both state and federal governments to forward a compelling
interest to justify any law that substantially burdens religious exercise. Assuming the statute is a
constitutional exercise of congressional power, RFRA is an ironic vindication of Justice Scalia's
reasoning in Smith that providing religious exemptions is best left in the hands of political majorities.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. Ironic, because RFRA is intended to eviscerate the impact of Smith.
Nevertheless, RFRA is thin gruel for those who reject Smith's narrow reading of the Free
Exercise Clause. RFRA is a majoritarian protection subject to later repeal or modification by shift-
ing political coalitions. Even if left intact, the statutory terms themselves may receive the same
narrow reading as that given to the Free Exercise Clause in Smith. As this Article points out, such a
reading fails to recognize the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment and the intentions of those who
made that amendment part of our higher law.
7 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. The Court continues to rely on Justice Scalia's reasoning in
Smith. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2225 (1993).
8 See infra part I. But cf Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409 (1990) (arguing that the Framers accepted an
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that mandated religious exemptions).
9 See infra part I.
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But perhaps we have been looking in the wrong place. If 1791 was
the first and last time We the People considered the proper scope of our
religious liberty, it may be appropriate (if not mandatory) that the Court
seek the guidance of those who originally drafted and adopted the
clause.10 If, on the other hand, the original scope of the Free Exercise
Clause was later found inadequate and subsequently altered by way of a
constitutional amendment, then a jurisprudence that relies on the inten-
tions of the Founders does so at the expense of popular sovereignty and
the People's right to amend their Constitution.
This Article explores the proposition that the Free Exercise Clause
was adopted a second time through its incorporation into the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the scope
of the new Free Exercise Clause was intended to include protections un-
anticipated at the Founding. Contrary to Jeffersonian notions of "sepa-
rate spheres," the nation by the time of Reconstruction had experienced
decades of clashes resulting from the overlapping concerns of religion
and government. In particular, the suppression of slave religion called
into question the government's power to interfere, even indirectly, with
legitimate religious exercise. Accordingly, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause incorporated a conception of religious liberty vastly different from
that intended in 1791 and constitutes a constitutional modification of the
original "rights of conscience." Religious exemptions from generally ap-
plicable laws, considered unnecessary and improbable at the Founding,
now became necessary and proper.
Part I explores the federalist structure of the original First Amend-
ment, as well as contemporary assumptions regarding the proper rela-
tionship between religion and government. Although the drafters of the
First Amendment religion clauses intended to prevent Congress from ex-
ercising any power over the subject of religion, the prohibition likely
went no further than laws attempting to regulate religion qua religion.
Moreover, whatever indirect effect Congress's enumerated powers might
have on religious exercise, the separationist assumptions held by both
Madison and Jefferson indicated that such effects would be minimal. Be-
lieving that church and state had separate and distinct concerns (touch-
ing only on "unessential points"), it is unlikely that either Madison or
Jefferson anticipated a need for religious exemptions.
Part II looks at the interaction between religion and government
that occurred in the period between the Founding and Reconstruction.
10 This Article accepts the interpretive legitimacy of inquiring into the intentions of those who
adopted or amended a particular constitutional text. Indeed, such an inquiry seems unavoidable if
courts are to distinguish between the ordinary laws of transient majorities and the majority-proof
laws of the Constitution. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1992) (describing American
constitutional law as a "two-track" system where the People enact "higher law" and then withdraw
from the political scene, leaving "ordinary politics" to their representatives). As this Article hopes
to show, however, one must locate the relevant intent.
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Religious republicanism and socially activist religion both challenged the
separationist admonition that church and state each keep to its own con-
cerns. Although, like separationism, religious republicanism rejected the
need for religious exemptions, the view that government had a duty to
support and protect the religious exercise of the majority laid the theoret-
ical groundwork for the eventual support and protection of minority reli-
gious exercise.
Part III describes the obliteration of the separate spheres theory re-
sulting from the clash between the abolitionists and the slaveholding
states. Given the political activities of the abolitionists and slavery's sup-
pression of religious exercise, the idea that religion and government had
"wholly distinct concerns" became demonstrably untenable. While the
Founders may have thought religious-political conflicts would involve
only "unessential points," it now was apparent that the most crucial con-
cerns of religion and government could clash irreconcilably.
In light of decades of experiences entirely different from those antic-
ipated by the Founders, Part IV explores the new interpretations of the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses that arose in the period prior to
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Originally intended as an
establishment-neutral reservation of power to the state majorities, the
words of the Establishment Clause were now invoked by the states them-
selves as expressing the rights of citizens against state majorities. Most
significantly, for the first time the rights of conscience were interpreted at
a federal level to require a religious exemption from military service.
Finally, Part V focuses on the drafting of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the scope of religious liberty intended to be embraced within
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Explicitly targeting the "generally
applicable" laws of the southern states as impermissible intrusions upon
the rights of conscience, the Thirty-ninth Congress signaled its intent to
extend the protection of the Free Exercise Clause beyond laws that regu-
lated religion qua religion. On the assumption that religion and govern-
ment would occasionally come into conflict as each pursued its legitimate
ends, it was now conceivable that the laws of the majority would some-
times be required to accommodate the religious exercise of individuals.
I. THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND THE FOUNDERS: FEDERALISM AND
SEPARATIONISM
Professor Michael McConnell has made the most significant attempt
to date to identify an intention to include religious exemptions within the
scope of the original Free Exercise Clause.11 McConnell relies heavily on
11 See McConnell, supra note 8. But see Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right to Religious
Exemptions: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992) (arguing that 18th-cen-
tury Americans assumed that the Free Exercise Clause did not provide religious exemptions); Ellis
West, The Case Against a Right to Religious-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
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two historical sources: (1) the contemporary protection of free exercise
within the states12 and (2) the writings of James Madison. 13 The first,
state law, faces a translation problem; it assumes that the protection of
religious freedom in the states can be translated into the federalist struc-
ture of the original First Amendment. The second source is considerably
weakened by separationist assumptions held by both James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson; as long as religion and government remained in sepa-
rate spheres, there would be no occasion for religious exemptions.
A. The Federalist First Amendment
Any attempt to equate religious rights provisions in contemporary
state constitutions with those contained in the First Amendment must
first confront striking differences in how those provisions were con-
structed. To begin with, no state constitution had ever used the term
"respecting" (as in "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion") in regard to religious freedom. The "respecting an
establishment" language does not express a value of "nonestablishment."
In fact, opinion was divided at the time of the Founding over whether
religious establishments were a danger to, or essential for, democracy.1 4
Instead, the establishment-neutral Clause expressed a principle of
nonenumeration: power "respecting establishments" was prohibited to
the federal government and reserved to the states.
The Amendment begins by stating that "Congress shall make no
law."15 By referring at the outset to Congress, the First Amendment be-
PoL'Y 591, 623 (1990) (same); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Com-
pelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 357 (1989-90) (same).
12 For example, McConnell believes that contemporary state constitutions "provide the most
direct evidence of the original understanding [of the Free Exercise Clause], for it is reasonable to
infer that those who drafted and adopted the first amendment assumed the term 'free exercise of
religion' meant what it had meant in their states." McConnell, supra note 8, at 1456. McConnell
points to the use of terms like "exercise," "duties," and "worship" for the proposition that the
freedom extended beyond mere "beliefs," id. at 1458-61, and "peace and safety" provisos as indica-
tions that religious exercise was to be exempt from generally applicable laws so long as it did not
disturb the public peace, id. at 1461-66. But see, Hamburger, supra note 11, at 918 (noting that, to
an 18th-century lawyer, "every breach of law is against the peace").
13 McConnell, supra note 8, at 1473-1503. McConnell distinguishes the views of Madison from
those held by Thomas Jefferson. Both Madison and Jefferson, however, read the First Amendment
as an expression of nonenumeration, and both were religious separationists. As this section shows,
these views cut against a theory of the religion clauses that requires religious exemptions. See, e.g.,
id. at 1488.
14 The last state establishment did not disappear until the 1830s-long after the adoption of the
Establishment Clause. Even at that time, there were those who believed that government support of
religion was essential to democracy. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
§ 986 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) ("[T]he right of a society or government to interfere in
matters of religion will hardly be contested by any persons, who believe that piety, religion, and
morality are intimately connected with the well being of the state, and indispensable to the adminis-
tration of civil justice.").
1 The First Amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
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gins a theme that runs as a leitmotif throughout the original Bill of
Rights, that of federalism. When read in conjunction with other provi-
sions, in particular the Tenth Amendment, the First Amendment signals
an intention to give Congress no enumerated power over matters such as
religion and speech, reserving the same "to the States respectively, or to
the people." 16 Indeed, fears that the new government might attempt to
exercise powers not granted soon were borne out in the controversy sur-
rounding the Alien and Sedition Acts when the party in power criminal-
ized criticism of the government. Speaking from the sanctuary of the
state legislative assemblies, Jefferson and Madison respectively drafted
the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, which claimed the Acts were a
direct violation of the principles of federalism as expressed in the First
and Tenth Amendments. 17 According to Thomas Jefferson:
[T]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to
the people; and that, no power over the freedom of religion, freedom of
speech, or freedom of the press, being delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, all lawful powers respecting
the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the states, or to the
people.18
Although the Tenth Amendment speaks of powers retained by the
people as well as the states, the Kentucky Resolutions go on to specify
that the "liberty and happiness" that had been violated was that of "the
several states.' 19 Similarly, the Virginia Resolutions, drafted by James
Madison, declared that by passing the Acts, Congress had "exercis[ed]
... power not delegated by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, ex-
pressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto."' 20
The Acts were thus a violation of "rights, and liberties, reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people."'21 As did Jefferson, Madison be-
lieved the right violated was that of the states, not of "the people."'22
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
16 Id. amend. X.
17 See Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10 & 14, 1798), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 131 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter FOUN-
DERS' CONST.]; James Madison, The Virginia Resolutions (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in 5 FOUN-
DERS' CONsT., supra, at 135.
18 Jefferson, supra note 17, at 132.
19 Id. at 135. As Jefferson explained to Abigail Adams in 1804: "While we deny that Congress
has a right to control the freedom of the press, we have ever asserted the right of the states, and their
exclusive right, to do so." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 n.1, 311 n.1 (Paul L. Ford ed., New York, G.P. Put-
nam's Sons 1897).
20 Madison, supra note 17, at 136.
21 Id. at 135.
22 See James Madison, Address of the General Assembly to the People of the Commonwealth of
Virginia (Jan. 23, 1799), in 5 FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 17, at 139, 139 (declaring that, by the
1112
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Although Madison would have amended the Constitution to protect the
"equal rights of conscience" within the several states, Congress rejected
his attempt to do So.2 3
Even if the original Free Exercise Clause was intended to express
norms of individual freedom, the scope of the Clause appears to be lim-
ited to a prohibition of laws that abridge religion qua religion. As Profes-
sor McConnell points out, although the original Free Exercise Clause
withholds congressional power over religion as such, Congress had a
great deal of enumerated power in other areas that might implicate reli-
gious exercise. 24 Accordingly, when Madison claimed that Congress had
"no power to abridge,"'25 he can only have meant that Congress had no
power to abridge religion through a religion-based law. If this is the
"original intention" incorporated against the states, it does not protect
free exercise from generally applicable (religiously-neutral) laws.
In addition to the logic of the text, the very spirit of the federalist
First Amendment cuts against an interpretation of the original Clause as
protecting minority religious exercise. Madison saw two main problems
facing republican governments: (1) protecting citizens generally from
government officials pursuing their own self-interested agendas at the ex-
pense of their constituents and (2) protecting individuals and minorities
from tyrannical majority factions of fellow citizens. 26 The fact that the
First Amendment restrained only Congress indicates that its primary
purpose was to guard against the first-attenuated representation-
rather than tyrannical majorities.2 7
principles embodied in the Acts, "the States will be stripped of every right reserved, by the concur-
rent claims of a paramount Legislature") (emphasis added).
23 Madison proposed an amendment to the Constitution which would have prohibited state ma-
jorities from infringing upon "the equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech or of the
press, nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal cases." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 783 (Joseph Gales
ed., 1789). Madison's proposal passed the House of Representatives but died in the Senate. See
Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1149 (1991).
24 McConnell, supra note 8, at 1478. Madison's speech introducing the Bill of Rights to Con-
gress indicates that he understood that granted powers could be overextended and abused. See 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 23, at 456 ("It is true, the powers of the General Government are
circumscribed, they are directed at particular objects; but even if the government keeps within those
limits, it has certain discretionary powers with respect to the means."). The danger was Congress
taking on "implied powers" as the means for carrying out its duties. Id. The solution was a Bill that
explicitly stated that Congress had "no power" over certain subjects, as in "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion." But even this would do no more than prevent the
federal government from using religion as a means to accomplish an enumerated responsibility.
Madison's interpretation of the Bill of Rights does not implicate generally applicable laws that do
not target religion as either an end or a means. But cf. Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of
Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE
L.J. 1711 (1990).
25 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, excerpted in 5 FOUNDERS' CONST., supra
note 17, at 141, 146-47.
26 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323-25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
27 See Amar, supra note 23, at 1148. Madison himself believed that the greater danger was in
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To our ears, the Bill of Rights in general, and the First Amendment
in particular, sound in terms of libertarianism-the protection of individ-
ual rights against unwarranted intrusion by the government. 28 However,
as the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions make clear, the First Amend-
ment was originally understood to protect the rights of popular majori-
ties against a possibly unrepresentative and self-interested Congress. Not
only were the rights of individuals in the states not protected, but an
attempt to exempt the religiously scrupulous from military service-a
common exemption in contemporary state constitutions 29-failed. 30
Given the above background, interpreting the original First Amend-
ment to include religious exemptions is problematic on several grounds.
First, the primary concern of the Founders was the right of the majority
to representative government, not the needs of minorities (and minority
faiths). Second, even if the original Free Exercise Clause could be read
as an expression of individual rights, it would prohibit only those laws
that directly targeted religion. Thus, an intention to provide for religious
exemptions was, at the very least, unlikely. In fact, given the separation-
ist views held by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, religious exemp-
tions appear unnecessary.
B. Separationism
To men like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the concerns
animating the religion clauses of the First Amendment did not end at the
federal level. 31 Jefferson's advocacy of a "wall" between church and
state was based on his assumption that religion and government belonged
to separate spheres and that each could and ought to be prevented from
"that which possess the highest prerogative of power. But this is not found either in the executive or
the legislative departments of Government, but in the body of the people, operating by the majority
against the minority." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 23, at 454-55. Madison's attempt to
amend the Constitution to protect against state majorities, however, was rejected. See supra note 23
and accompanying text.
28 A "mistake" that reflects the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, at which time minority
rights were explicitly protected. Thus, as this Article attempts to show, the relevant "original inten-
tions" are those of the persons who effected the transformation.
29 See Hamburger, supra note 11, at 940.
30 As with Madison's proposed amendment protecting the rights of conscience, a proposed mili-
tia exemption passed the House, but was removed by the Senate. See id. at 928. But see McConnell,
supra note 8, at 1501-02 (arguing that the rejection of a militia exemption is not a rejection of
exemptions per se, but a reflection of the government's compelling interest).
31 This Article concentrates on the views of Madison and Jefferson not because those views were
representative of all the Founders. See, eg., ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NA-
TION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 21 (1990) (describing the Founders' main strands of
thought on the religion question as "enlightenment separationist," "pietistic separationist," and
"political centrist"). Nor do I mean to minimize the difference in views among the men themselves.
See McConnell, supra note 8, at 1452 (distinguishing between the religious views of Jefferson and
Madison). Rather, the focus is meant only to highlight those points upon which Madison and Jeffer-
son did agree, and to consider the appropriateness of using their views as a guide to post-Fourteenth
Amendment religion clause jurisprudence.
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intruding upon the other's domain.3 2 To Jefferson, this meant not only
that government should be prevented from interfering with matters of
religious belief,33 but also that it should stay out of religious matters alto-
gether.34 The federal government was prohibited from passing any law
"respecting religion."35
The free exercise of religion had its boundaries as well. Although
religion was to be protected in its "doctrines, discipline, or exercises," '36 it
had no right to be excluded from "social duties."'37 Religious faith,
moreover, was a personal affair and should be free from interference by
32 The famous "wall between church and state" comes from Jefferson's letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association in which he writes:
I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared
that the legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between church and State.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)
[hereinafter Danbury Letter], in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 510, 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1984) [hereinafter WRITINGS]. Jefferson was influenced by the writings of John Locke, who had
deemed it necessary "to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion,
and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other." JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION (1686), reprinted in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE
POWERS THAT ARE 78 (1987); see also, Hamburger, supra note 11, at 938-946 (canvassing eight-
eenth-century writings which differentiated between the temporal and spiritual worlds).
33 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, reprinted in WRITINGS, supra
note 32, at 123, 285 ("The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious
to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.").
34 Jefferson's belief in the separation of church and state was influenced by the Enlightenment.
See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 149 (1991). There were also religious reasons for advocating separationist principles. See
id. at 159 (distinguishing between the "political rationale" of Madison and Jefferson and the "theo-
logical rationale" represented by Roger Williams). Again, the point is not to discount the influence
of other views on the intended meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, but to specifically explore the
intentions of those who have had the greatest impact on subsequent interpretation of the Clause.
35 Jefferson described the religion clauses as "the provision that no law shall be made respecting
the establishment or free exercise, of religion" without any sense of having reworded the amendment.
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in WRITINGS, supra note
32, at 1186, 1186-87 (emphasis added). The description is a telling example of Jefferson's belief that
government was to remain agnostic towards religion, neither supporting nor abridging its exercise.
Early in his career Jefferson seemed to endorse government support of religion, if only on a state
level. See William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback
of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1203 (1990) (pointing out that as a legislator Jefferson
voted in favor of a bill empowering Virginia's governor to declare a day of prayer and thanksgiving,
as well as making such a decree himself as governor). Yet in his later years, Jefferson clearly rejected
the idea that government had any business involving itself in religious matters. The "alliance" of
Church and State was antithetical to the advance of science and Reason. See Thomas Jefferson,
Report of the Commissioners for the University of Virginia (Aug. 14, 1818), in WRITINGS, supra
note 32, at 457, 462; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Moses Robinson (March 23, 1801), in WRIT-
INGS, supra note 32, at 1087. Moreover, the alliance was completely unnecessary-religion and
government could both survive without the support of the other. See Smith, supra note 34, at 165
n.68.
36 Letter from Jefferson to Rev. Miller, supra note 35, at 1186.
37 Danbury Letter, supra note 32, at 510.
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priests or proselytizers. 38 In fact, Jefferson was deeply troubled by the
"fanatical" religious revivals that swept the country in the initial decades
of the nineteenth century. 39
Similarly, James Madison rejected the idea that government had any
proper role in the establishment or support of religion. 4° Because of the
"tendency to a usurpation on one side or the other, or to a corrupting
coalition or alliance between them," the best solution was "an entire ab-
stinence of the Govt. from interference in any way whatever, beyond the
necessity of preserving public order, & protecting each sect agst. tres-
passes on its legal rights by others. '41 Significantly, Madison believed
that although a complete separation of religion and government was not
possible, whatever overlap remained would involve only "unessential
points." 42
Jefferson and Madison were both what I call "separationist" repub-
licans by which I mean they believed religion and government could and
ought to remain in separate spheres. Although most often invoked in
terms of the Establishment Clause, separation of church and state had
free exercise implications as well. Jefferson's famous Wall was supported
by assumptions regarding the proper roles of religion and government-
roles that made the need for religious exemptions highly unlikely.
Supporting one side of the Wall was the belief that republican gov-
ernment could survive without active support of religion.43 Government
38 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. Samuel H. Smith (Aug. 6, 1816), in WRITINGS, supra
note 32, at 1403, 1404 ("I have ever thought religion a concern purely between our God and our
consciences for which we were accountable to him, and not to the priests. I have never told my own
religion, nor scrutinized that of another. I have never attempted to make a convert, nor wished to
change another's creed.").
39 In a letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper, Nov. 2, 1822,-Jefferson lamented
[tihe atmosphere of our country is unquestionably charged with a threatening cloud of fanati-
cism, lighter in some parts, denser in others, but too heavy in all.... In our Richmond there is
much fanaticism, but chiefly among the women. They have their night meetings and praying
parties, where, attended by their priests, and sometimes by a hen-pecked husband, they pour
forth the effusions of their love to Jesus, in terms as amatory and carnal, as their modesty would
permit them to use to a mere earthly lover.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), in WRITINGS, supra note 32, at
1463, 1464.
40 Madison explicitly rejected the idea that "without some sort of alliance or coalition between
Govt. & Religion neither can be duly supported." Letter from James Madison to Edward Living-
ston (July 10, 1822), excerpted in 5 FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 17, at 105, 105. He fought
religious assessments in Virginia, see James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli-
gious Assessments (June 20, 1785), in 5 FoUNDERS' CONST., supra note 17, at 82, and in his later
years believed that the appointment of Chaplains to the Houses of Congress violated the Establish-
ment Clause, see James Madison, Detached Memoranda (ca. 1817), in 5 FOUNDERS' CONST., supra
note 17, at 103, 104.
41 Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), excerpted in, 5 FOUNDERS' CONST., supra
note 17, at 107, 107-08.
42 Id.
43 Advocating what they termed an "experiment," both Jefferson and Madison maintained that
government and religion could survive without either actively supporting the other. See Smith,
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therefore had no reason to involve itself in the affairs of religion.44 Sup-
porting the other side was the assumption that religion is a private matter
that need never involve itself with worldly matters-so long as the world
refrained from establishing a particular sect.45
Neither Jefferson nor Madison believed the Wall to be impenetra-
ble-there remained some overlap between religious rights and civil au-
thority. Yet, by removing the authority of the government to legislate
directly on religion qua religion and by advocating a "rational" and,
above all, personal religion, separationists could expect that whatever
conflicts arose would involve only trivial matters.
C. Implications for Religious Exemptions
The federalist First Amendment left little room for religious exemp-
tions. When the federalist reading of the Bill of Rights is combined with
separationist assumptions, the door to religious exemptions seems to
close. As long as religion and government kept to themselves, there
would be no reason to expect legitimate religious exercise to clash with
the legitimate powers of government. Clashes that did occur meant that
either religion or government had moved beyond its appropriate bound-
supra note 34, at 164 n.68. While government required some degree of religious faith among the
citizenry, id. at 164 n.63, both would best flourish when freed from interference by the other.
44 William Rawle braces this side of Jefferson's Wall when he asserts that, since religious intoler-
ance is the only possible motive Congress could have for legislating on the subject of religion, "the
power was thus removed." WILLIAM RAWLE, A ViEw OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 121 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea, 2d ed. 1829). Although individual
states were free to legislate on religious matters, most had "recognized the perfect freedom of con-
science." Id. at 122.
45 Laws "establishing a religion" could be expected to conflict with minority faiths. In fact, at
the time of the Founding, the paradigmatic example of a religious exemption was a minority sect
seeking to be exempt from a religiously based law, such as an oath requirement or religious assess-
ment. Derisively referred to as "tolerations," the concept was excoriated by many including Thomas
Paine. See THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1791), excerpted in 5 FOUNDERS' CONsT., supra
note 17, at 95, 95 ("Toleration is not the opposite of intoleration, but is the counterfeit of it. Both are
despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding liberty of conscience, and the other of
granting it. The one is the Pope, armed with fire and faggot, and the other is the Pope selling or
granting indulgences. The former is church and state, and the latter is church and traffic.").
Writing in 1803, St. George Tucker quotes Paine's Rights of Man and then states:
Toleration can take place only where there is a civil establishment of a particular mode of
religion; that is, where a predominant sect enjoys exclusive advantages, and makes the encour-
agement of its own mode of faith and worship a part of the constitution of the state; but at the
same time thinks fit to suffer the exercise of other modes of faith and worship.
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (1803), excerpted in 5 FOUNDERS' CONST.,
supra note 17, at 96, 97.
Tucker did not limit religious freedom to "opinions" only, but explicitly stated that liberty of
conscience included religious duties as well. Id. at 96-97. Professor McConnell cites this as evidence
that Tucker had a broader conception of religious freedom than Jefferson. See McConnell, supra
note 8, at 1452. As the above passage illustrates, however, Tucker placed "exemptions" in the same
category as Thomas Paine: "tolerations" that would disappear with the abolishing of
establishments.
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ary. As the previous section points out, attempts to place religious ex-
emptions in the Constitution failed, as did the attempt to protect
religious equality in the states. At the very least, then, the evidence is
ambiguous regarding the Founders' intent to provide for exemptions
from generally applicable laws.
The Founding, however, is not the end of the story. In the years
following the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, new
experiences shaped assumptions regarding the optimal scope of religious
liberty. Different theories of the proper relationship between church and
state would find expression in the actions of the government as well as
religious groups. Focus on Founders like Jefferson and Madison, and
one sees federalism .and separationism. By Reconstruction, however, a
very different picture had emerged.
II. THE NEW REPUBLIC: RELIGIOUS REPUBLICANISM AND THE
RISE OF RELIGIOUS SOCIAL ACTIVISM
A. Expanding the Sphere of Government: Religious Republicanism
1. The Religious Republican View of the Role of Religion in a De-
mocracy.-At the same time that separationists were fighting the good
fight against government-supported religion in Virginia, a number of
states had enacted laws that assumed it was the government's duty both
to support and to protect the religious exercise of the majority.46 I call
this approach religious republicanism.
In his Farewell Address, George Washington issued a warning:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Reli-
gion and Morality are indispensable supports.... And let us with caution
indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion.
Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds
of peculiar structure; reason and experience both forbid us to expect that
national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.47
Since the time of the Revolution, republican political theory had
embraced the idea that government had a responsibility to support and
encourage religion as a means to promote public morality.48 Separation-
46 This fact by itself calls into question an interpretation of the religion clauses that focuses
solely on the views of Jefferson and Madison. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1161 (2d ed. 1988).
47 1 ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 494-95 (1950) (quoting
George Washington, Farewell Address (1796)).
48 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 426-29
(1969). If anything, the "new" idea was the separationist theory that religion and government did
not require one another's support. According to James Madison, "the prevailing opinion in Europe,
England not excepted, has been that Religion could not be preserved without the support of the
Government nor Government be supported without an established religion." Letter from James
Madison to Rev. Jasper Adams (1832), in CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 77 (John F.
Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman eds., 2d ed. 1987). Therefore, "[i]t remained for North America to
bring the great & interesting subject to a fair, and finally to a decisive test." Id. See generally,
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ists like Jefferson read the religion clauses as requiring government to
take an agnostic stance-no law could issue "respecting religion"
whether that law be for or against religious exercise.49 The new United
States, however, was anything but agnostic. Major religious movements
occurred between the Revolution and the Civil War. 50 By the early nine-
teenth century, it had become apparent that the federal government, as
well as the states, would play a role in the promotion of "general
religion."51
Where constitutional scholars like Rawle and Tucker had stressed
separationism in their interpretation of the First Amendment, 52 by the
1830s Joseph Story could write that "the right of a society or government
to interfere in matters of religion will hardly be contested by any persons,
who believe that piety, religion, and morality are intimately connected
with the well being of the state, and indispensable to the administration
of civil justice. '5 3 Indeed, those who believed in the truth of Christianity
Smith, supra note 34, at 164-65 (discussing the received wisdom that church and state must work
together).
49 Letter from Jefferson to Rev. Miller, supra note 35, at 1186-87 (describing the religion clauses
as "the provision that no law shall be made respecting the establishment, or free exercise, of
religion").
50 In particular, the Second Great Awakening, which occurred in the 1820s-30s. See GORDON
S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992). What is known as the First
Great Awakening occurred in the mid-eighteenth century. See 1 STOKES, supra note 47, at 240-41.
51 In the period between the Founding and the Civil War, the government in Washington explic-
itly supported religion in a variety of ways. Perhaps the first exhibition of religious republicanism
was George Washington's Inaugural in 1789 which included the "divine service." See 1 STOKES,
supra note 47, at 484. Maj. Pierre Charles L'Enfant, as part of his design for the "national city,"
presented designs to President Washington for "the grand church," which was "intended for na-
tional purposes, such as public prayer, thanksgivings, funeral Orations, &c., and assigned to no
particular Sect or denomination, but equally open to all." Id. at 493; see also George Washington,
Proclamation: A National Thanksgiving (Oct. 3, 1789), in 5 FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 17, at
94, 94 ("[I]t is the duty of all nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God, to obey His
will, to be grateful for His benefits, and humbly to implore His protection and favor .... And also
that we may then unite in most humbly offering our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and
Ruler of Nations ... to enable us all ... to promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and
virtue .... ).
The sentiment radiated beyond Washington. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 established
public education for the purpose of promoting "religion, morality, and knowledge." Northwest Or-
dinance of 1787, ch. 8, art. III, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n.(a) (1789). There was also federal support of Chris-
tian education of the Indians, including Jefferson's treaty with the Kaskasia Indians, which provided
for a salary paid by the United States government for a Catholic priest and for U.S. funding of the
erection of a Catholic church. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kaskasia
Tribe of Indians, Aug. 13, 1803, reprinted in ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
261 (1982); see also Vidal v. Philadelphia, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 198-199 (1844) (Story, J.) ("It is
unnecessary for us... to consider what would be the legal effect of a devise in Pennsylvania for the
establishment of a school or college, for the propagation of Judaism, or Deism, or any other form of
infidelity. Such a case is not to be presumed to exist in a Christian country ... .
52 See supra notes 44-45.
53 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (1833), excerpted in 5 FOUNDERS'
CONST., supra note 17, at 108, 108.
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had the right to expect the government "to foster, and encourage it
among all the citizens and subjects."' 54
Implicit in nineteenth-century religious republicanism was the idea
that We the People were a religious people and had created a national
government grounded on religious principles.5 5 The idea of a national
faith was symbolically represented in a variety of actions by the first ad-
ministration 56 and found expression in law in the 1811 case of People v.
Ruggles.5 7 In Ruggles, Chancellor James Kent upheld a conviction for
blasphemy on the grounds that, although New York had no explicit blas-
phemy laws, "to revile with malicious and blasphemous contempt, the
religion professed by almost the whole community ... strike[s] at the
root of moral obligation, and weaken[s] the security of the social ties."58
Declared Chancellor Kent: "[W]e are a christian people, and the moral-
ity of the country is deeply ingrafted upon christianity." 59
Similarly, in Updegraph v. Commonwealth,60 Judge Duncan repeats
Chancellor Kent's statement that "we are a christian people" and notes
that "[n]o society can tolerate a wilful and despiteful attempt to subvert
its religion, no more than it would break down its laws-a general, mali-
cious, and deliberate attempt to overthrow Christianity, general Christi-
anity. '61 Religion was "the cement of civil union, and the essential
support of legislation. '62
Again, what is striking in these decisions is the assumption of a na-
tional faith.63 If the government is based upon adherence to certain prin-
54 Id.; see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 292 (George Lawrence
trans., J.P. Mayer ed., 1969) (1833) ("Religion, which never intervenes directly in the government of
American society, should ... be considered as the first of their political institutions, for although it
did not give them the taste for liberty, it singularly facilitates their use thereof.").
55 According to Tocqueville, "For the Americans the ideas of Christianity and liberty are so
completely mingled that it is almost impossible to get them to conceive of the one without the
other." Id. at 293.
56 See supra note 51.
57 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811), reprinted in 5 FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 17, at 101.
58 Id. at 101-02.
59 Id. at 101 (emphasis added). The idea that law should reflect the religious character of the
people survived well into the twentieth century. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)
(Douglas, J.) ("We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.").
60 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824), reprinted in 5 FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 17, at 170.
61 Id. at 173. Judge Duncan goes on to state that "[b]y general Christianity is not intended the
doctrine or worship of any particular church or sect; the law leaves these disputes to theologians; it is
not known as a standard by which to decide political dogmas." Id. at 174.
62 Id. (paraphrasing Plutarch).
63 For example, the New York State Constitutional Convention of 1821 declared their support
for the Ruggles decision and turned back an attempt to include a provision stating that no particular
religion shall be "declared or adjudged" the law of the land. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF 1821: ASSEMBLED FOR THE PURPOSE OF AMENDING THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 464, 574-77 (1821); see also State v. Ambs, 20 Mo.
214, 216-17 (1854) ("[The Missouri constitution] appears to have been made by Christian men. The
constitution, on its face, shows that the Christian religion was the religion of its framers.");
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ciples of religious faith, it is both "necessary and proper" for the
government to support and protect that faith.64 Note that under the sep-
arationist-federalist reading of the First Amendment, this is exactly what
the national government could not do; the national government was in-
tended to have no power "respecting religion. '65 The religious republi-
cans, however, shifted the focus of the religion clauses from the agnostic
term "respecting" and onto (what they believed to be) the sectarian term
"establishment."
Recall that to Jefferson and Madison, the term "respecting" applied
to both the Establishment and Free Exercise 66-it was an agnostic term
representing the intention to reserve power over religion to the states.
The religious republicans, on the other hand, particularized "respecting"
by focusing on the Establishment Clause and interpreting it to refer to
the establishment of a particular Christian sect. According to Joseph
Story,
The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less ad-
vance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity;
but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any na-
tional ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the
exclusive patronage of the national government. 67
Although the Establishment Clause prevented the federal govern-
Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548, 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861) ("Religious tolerance is entirely
consistent with a recognized religion. Christianity may be conceded to be the established religion, to
the qualified extent mentioned, while perfect civil and political equality, with freedom of conscience
and religious preference, is secured to individuals of every other creed and profession.").
64 Joseph Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, noted that "there will probably be
found few persons in this, or in any other Christian country, who would deliberately contend, that it
was unreasonable, or unjust to foster and encourage Christian religion generally, as a matter of
sound policy, as well as revealed truth." STORY, supra note 53, at 108. "Probably at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, and of the [First Amendment] ... the general, if not universal, senti-
ment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far as was
not incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious worship." Id. at
109.
65 See, eg., Letter from Jefferson to Rev. Miller, supra note 35, at 1186-87 (emphasis added); see
also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
66 See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Madison, supra note 17, at 146-47 ("For if
Congress may regulate the freedom of the press, provided they do not abridge it, because it is said
only 'they shall not abridge it,' and is not said, 'they shall make no law respecting it,' the analogy of
reasoning is conclusive that Congress may regulate and even abridge the free exercise of religion,
provided they do not prohibit it; because it is said only 'they shall not prohibit it,' and is not said
'they shall make no law respecting, or no law abridging it.' ").
67 STORY, supra note 53, at 109. At different points in his Commentaries, Story appears to adopt
both the old federalist view of the First Amendment and the new religious republican view of the
religion clauses. On the one hand, Story asserts that "the right of a society or government to inter-
fere in matters of religion will hardly be contested by any persons," and that the duty "to foster, and
encourage [Christianity] among all the citizens and subjects" was "a point wholly distinct from that
of the right of private judgment in matters of religion, and of the freedom of public worship accord-
ing to the dictates of one's conscience." Id. at 108. On the other hand, "the whole power over the
subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments, to be acted upon according to their
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ment from establishing a particular religious sect, it did not prevent the
support and encouragement of what Judge Duncan called "general
Christianity. ' 68 Government action was constitutional as long as all
(Christian) sects were benefitted. 69 Prosecuting someone for blasphem-
ing the person of Christ involved a matter of concern to all Christians
and was, therefore, a matter "independent of any religious establishment
or the rights of the church."'70
In its rejection of the separationist admonition that government re-
main aloof from spiritual affairs, religious republicanism constitutes a
breach of Jefferson's Wall. The breach, however, moved in only one di-
rection; although the government had an interest in involving itself with
religion, religion was still expected to remain in its sphere. More than
this, government wielded the power to define the scope of that sphere.
2. Religious Exemptions Under Religious Republicanism: Defining
the Sphere of Minority Free Exercise.-In the age of religious republican-
ism, the emphasis was on republicanism. Although good government
was served by encouraging religion in general, the public good still took
precedence over religious scruples; where the two conflicted, religion had
to yield to the majority. Accordingly, the sphere of religion expanded or
contracted according to the majority's definition of "the public good."
Religious exemptions from generally applicable laws under such a system
would rarely be granted; compliance with a generally applicable law was
almost per se in the public interest.
In fact, religious exemptions were regularly denied. 7' According to
own sense of justice, and the state constitutions." Id. at 110 (emphases added). Story may have
intended to distinguish "sectarian power" from "power over general religion." To Story, the latter
would be within the legitimate scope of civil government.
68 See Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824), reprinted in 5 FOUN-
DERS' CONST., supra note 17, at 173; see also id. at 174 ("By general Christianity is not intended the
doctrine or worship of any particular church or sect.").
69 See Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49 (1815) (rejecting a claim that state laws
incorporating the Episcopal Church in Virginia violated that state's constitution and noting that "it
is difficult to perceive, how it follows as a consequence, that the legislature may not enact laws more
effectually to enable all sects to accomplish the great objects of religion by giving them corporate
rights for the management of their property, and the regulation of their temporal as well as spiritual
concerns").
70 Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 290; see also STORY, supra note 53, at 108.
71 See Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161 (1818) (refusing, without explanation, to overturn
a criminal conviction based on a confession made by a man to members of his church); People v.
Smith, 2 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 77 (N.Y. 1817), excerpted in Privileged Communications to
Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199, 209 (1955) (denying motion of defendant in a murder trial to bar
testimony of a Protestant clergyman to whom he had confessed while in prison); Specht v. Common-
wealth, 8 Pa. 312 (1848) (rejecting challenge of Sunday closing law by member of the Seventh Day
Baptist Congregation); Simon's Executors v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831) (rejecting argument
of Jewish plaintiff who had taken a nonsuit rather than appear in court on a Saturday, argument
based on the state liberty of conscience clause); Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle 48 (Pa.
1817) (rejecting challenge by a Jewish merchant to state Sunday closing law); Stansbury v. Marks, 2
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John Bannister Gibson, Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, the rights of conscience involved
[s]imply a right to worship the Supreme Being according to the dictates of
the heart; to adopt any creed or hold any opinion whatever on the subject of
religion; and to do, or forbear to do, any act for conscience sake, the doing
or forbearing of which, is not prejudicial to the public weal 72
To Chief Justice Gibson, "there are no duties half so sacred as those
which the citizen owes to the laws .... That every other obligation shall
yield to that of the laws, as to a superior moral force, is a tacit condition
of membership in every society, whether lay or secular, temporal or spiri-
tual, because no citizen can lawfully hold communion with those who
have associated on any other terms."'73 Thus, while there may be good
policy reasons for religious exemptions from generally applicable laws,
"considerations of policy address themselves with propriety to the legis-
lature, and not to a magistrate whose course is prescribed not by discre-
tion, but rules already established."74
The very premise of religious republicanism made religious exemp-
tions almost nonsensical. If religion was supported for the public good,
"conscientious doctrines and practices can claim no immunity from the
operation of general laws made for the government and to promote the
welfare of the whole people."'75 Although the cases reveal no clear pat-
tern in their rejection of religious exemption claims,76 they are all consis-
tent with the religious republican belief that the needs of society come
Dall. 213 (Pa. 1793) (Jewish man threatened with fine of £10 for refusing to be sworn as a witness
because it was Saturday, his Sabbath); State v. Willson, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 393 (1823) (rejecting
claim by a member of religious sect that an individual could refuse grand jury duty on the ground of
religious conscience).
72 Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle 155, 160 (Pa. 1828) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting)
(majority holding, on grounds not implicating the religion clauses of the state constitution, that trial
court did not err in excluding a juror whose religious beliefs were opposed to capital punishment).
73 Simon's Executors v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 417 (Pa. 1831).
74 Id.
75 Specht, 8 Pa. at 322.
76 Gratz and Willson are explicit rejections of religious exemptions. See supra note 71. Stans-
bury and Drake, however, are unexplained, and Wolfe and Specht, given the secular interests at
stake, can be distinguished from cases involving abridgment of religious exercise. See supra note 71.
Finally, Lesher, apart from the dissent that presages the views Gibson would later write into law in
Gratz, is constitutionally irrelevant. Even if not clear evidence of Religious Republicanism at work,
the "mixed-bag" nature of these cases is even less evidence of an operating principle in favor of
religious exemptions. McConnell discusses these cases and concludes that although religious exemp-
tions may have been disfavored at the appellate level, they may have been frequently granted as a
matter of judicial discretion in the lower courts. See McConnell, supra note 8, at 1510-11. Even if
true, it is difficult to see how this would support a view of constitutionally compelled religious exemp-
tions. It is also possible that religious scruples were protected on a more informal level. See Carol
Weisbrod, Comment on Curry and Firmage Articles, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 315 (1989). This certainly
appears to be the case with juries refusing to convict those assisting runaway slaves. See infra part
V. Such exemptions were discretionary, of course, and do not implicate the constitutional restraints
on government.
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before the beliefs of a religious minority.77
In this belief, religious republicanism shared the majoritarian ideol-
ogy animating the original First Amendment. Indeed, both religious re-
publicanism and Jeffersonian separationism required religion to defer to
the perceived needs of the majority. According to Alexis de Tocqueville:
The more people are assimilated to one another and brought to an equality,
the more important it becomes that religions, while remaining studiously
aloof from the daily turmoil of worldly business, should not needlessly run
counter to prevailing ideas or the permanent interests of the mass of the
people .... So in all matters not contrary to faith one must defer to the
majority. 78
Although (because) religion was essential to a democracy, the inter-
ests of the community prevailed over the claims of a minority sect. No-
where was this more evident than in the case of polygamy.
3. Polygamy.-The antipolygamy laws, introduced in the Thirty-
sixth Congress and passed in the Thirty-seventh, provide an excellent
window on the scope of religious freedom in the first half of the nine-
teenth century. Here we find all the elements of classic religious republi-
canism: the government's active involvement in religious matters, the
belief that religion and government are inextricably linked, and finally,
the requirement that minority faiths defer to the majority.
On February 15, 1860, in the House of Representatives, Justin Mor-
rill of Vermont introduced a bill "to punish and prevent the practice of
polygamy in the Territories of the United States and other places, and
disapproving and annulling certain acts of the Legislative Assembly of
the Territory of Utah."'79 The bill's preamble read:
[I]t is admitted that polygamy is permitted by the municipal regulations of
one of the Territories of this Union, and is sought to be justified on the
ground that this abomination in a Christian country is a religious rite of the
77 There is one contemporary example of a true religious exemption. See People v. Philips,
excerpted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, supra note 71, at 199. In this case from the
early 1800s, the New York Court of General Sessions held that a Catholic priest could not be com-
pelled to testify about statements made to him by the defendant during confession. Id.; see also 1
STOKES, supra note 47, at 838. Philips, however, appears to be unique. In fact, another New York
municipal court expressly declined to apply Philips to a case involving confession to a Protestant
clergyman. See People v. Smith, 2 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 77 (N.Y. 1817). Moreover, Philips
itself was criticized by at least one other state court. See Simon's Executors v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W.
412, 417 (Pa. 1831).
78 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 54, at 448. Tocqueville's caveat "in all matters not contrary to
faith" appears to leave the door open a crack to conscientious objection. The doorway, however,
was extremely narrow. Tocqueville limited the legitimate sphere of "faith" to matters having noth-
ing to do with civil government. See id. at 445 ("[R]eligions should be most careful to confine
themselves to their proper sphere, for if they wish to extend their power beyond spiritual matters
they run the risk of not being believed at all. They should therefore be at pains to define the sphere
in which they claim to control the human spirit, and outside that sphere it should be left completely
free to follow its own devices.").
79 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., Ist Sess. 793 (1860).
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inhabitants of said Territory; and that no principle of self-government or
citizen sovereignty can require or justify the practice of such moral
pollution.80
The bill criminalized the practice of polygamy and repealed the or-
dinance of the territorial government incorporating the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints "and all other acts.., which establish, sup-
port, maintain, shield, or countenance, polygamy. ' 81 Finally, the bill
carried a proviso:
[P]rovided, that this act shall be so limited and construed as not to affect or
interfere with the right of property legally acquired under the ordinance
heretofore mentioned, nor the right "to worship God according to the dic-
tates of conscience," but only to annul all acts and laws which establish,
maintain, protect, or countenance, the practice of polygamy, evasively
called spiritual marriage, however disguised by legal or ecclesiastical solem-
nities, sacraments, ceremonies, consecrations, or other contrivances.82
(a) A threat to the Republic.-What made polygamy so abhor-
rent-one of the "twin relics of barbarism" to the Republicans83-was
80 Id. at 1410. Interestingly, the bill's preamble was eventually removed on the ground that "[ilt
contains what is true; but it contains what should not be inserted in a law.... A law should speak in
the language, not of apology, or remonstrance, or entreaty, or argument, but of mandate--of com-
mand." Id. at 1495 (remarks of Mr. Millson).
81 Id. at 1410.
82 Id.
83 The other "twin" was slavery. In fact, by the mid-nineteenth century, the fates of slavery and
polygamy were inextricably bound together. As early as 1853, Charles Sumner had equated polyg-
amy with slavery in support of his argument that Congress had power to regulate "domestic institu-
tions" in the territories. Arguing against the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Sumner stated:
The relation of master and slave is sometimes classed with the domestic relations. Now, while it
is unquestionably among the powers of any State, within its own jurisdiction, to change the
existing relation of husband and wife, and to establish polygamy, I presume no person would
contend that a polygamous husband, resident in one of the States, would be entitled to enter the
national Territory with his harem-his property if you please-and there claim immunity.
Clearly, when he passes the bounds of that local jurisdiction, which sanctions polygamy, the
peculiar domestic relation would cease; and it is precisely the same with Slavery.
CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 268 app. (1854).
The Republican Party platform of 1856 declared that "the Constitution confers upon Congress
sovereign power over the territories of the United States for their government, and that in the exer-
cise of this power it is both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the territories those twin
relics of barbarism-Polygamy and Slavery." HoRAcE GREELEY & JOHN F. CLEVELAND, POLrr-
ICAL TEXT-BOOK FOR 1860, at 22 (Negro Universities Press 1969) (1886). The Republican assertion
that the power to regulate the one included the power to regulate the other was not lost on the
Democrats in the 36th Congress. See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1410 (1860) (remarks of
Mr. Branch) ("I will suggest to my friends upon this side of the House, that if we render polygamy
criminal, it may be claimed that we can also render criminal that other "twin relic of barbarism,"
slavery, as it is called in the Republican platform of 1856."). In fact, it was Democratic opposition
to the antipolygamy bill that prevented its passage until after the Civil War had begun and the
seceding states had withdrawn from Congress. See Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty
in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 416 n.39 (1986).
Mormonism originally was opposed to slavery. In his 1844 campaign for the Presidency of the
United States, Joseph Smith ran on a platform calling for the "break down [of] slavery" and removal
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the fact that it was a direct affront to the religious beliefs of the majority.
Polygamy was "a reproach to the Christian civilization."'8 4 It was a
"monstrosity," and an "offense against religion, and against the laws of
God."' 5 Congress thus had a duty to "overrule and correct Mormon
abuses and vices-to enforce among them the canons of an approved and
Christian morality."'8 6 Mormons should be "made subservient to the
standard of Christian morality, as well as the legal authority of the
Constitution. 87
The emphasis on forcing the Mormons to follow the standards of
"Christian morality" and "the legal authority of the Constitution" is tell-
ing-polygamy was not simply out of step with "accepted Christianity,"
but the domestic arrangements of the Mormons were likewise "repug-
nant to every principle of republican government."88 Indeed, polygamy
was impossible under a republican form of government "while the sexes
continue to be equal in numbers. Wherever it has existed . . . it has
always been protected by absolute military despotism. It can be sus-
tained under no other system of government. '8 9
of "the shackles from the poor black man." Newell G. Bringhurst, The Mormons and Slavery-A
Closer Look, 50 PAC. HisT. REV. 329 (1981), reprinted in 16 [RELIGION AND SLAVERY] ARTICLES
ON AMERICAN SLAVERY 65, 68 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989) [hereinafter RELIGION AND SLAVERY]
(quoting JOSEPH SMITH, JR., VIEWS ON THE GOVERNMENT AND POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES
3 (1844)). In 1852, however, Brigham Young and other Mormon leaders legalized slavery in Utah.
Id. The Mormons thus saw the southern members of Congress as natural allies when Mormon
polygamy came under increased attack in the 1850s and '60s. By that time, "both the Saints and
slaveholding southerners looked upon popular sovereignty and states rights as the best means to
protect their respective 'peculiar institutions' from outside attack." Id. at 69.
84 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1514 (1860) (remarks of Mr. McClernand).
85 Id. at 1498 (remarks of Mr. Etheridge); see also id. at 1540 (remarks of Mr. Gooch) ("[Polyg-
amy is] an evil which corrupts the morals of the community, pollutes the blood, and confounds all
title to property.").
86 Id. at 1515 (remarks of Mr. McClernand).
87 Id. (remarks of Mr. Clark).
88 Id. at 1496 (remarks of Mr. Pryor).
89 Id. at 1520 (remarks of Mr. Thayer). Thayer believed that as long as a democratic form of
government was maintained in the territories, polygamy would disappear on its own. The concern of
other members of Congress was, as Thayer himself pointed out, precisely that polygamy could sur-
vive under a despotic government-i.e., society under Brigham Young.
Along with an abhorrence to polygamy, there was also widespread suspicion of the Mormons
themselves. According to Mr. Simms of Kentucky, the Mormons "do not recognize the obligations
of our religion, or the oaths that are made sacred by it. They do not even recognize allegiance to our
Federal Government. They have set up for themselves; they stand in opposition to both." CONG.
GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 202 app. (1860). The belief that the Mormons were setting up a
government in opposition to the United States was widespread-and may have had some truth to it.
Originally, the Mormons proclaimed the kingdom of Deseret and did not recognize American au-
thority until threatened with military force in 1858. See Laycock, supra note 83, at 416 n.39; see also
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: His
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 352, 352-53 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946) (suggesting that it "is probable...
that the people of Utah are in open rebellion to the United States"). Indeed, some believed the
Mormons were engaged in setting up a theocracy in Utah in violation of the Establishment Clause of
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It is this link between "proper" religion (Protestant Christianity)
and the proper functioning of the republic that lies at the heart of the
antipolygamy laws. In fact, it would be difficult to find a practice more
offensive to the principles of the age, for polygamy not only implicated
religion in general, but also implicated the nation's source of religious
faith: women.
Alexis de Tocqueville, in his treatise on the United States, Democ-
racy in America, commented on women's special role in maintaining reli-
gion:
I do not doubt for an instant that the great severity of mores which one
notices in the United States has its primary origin in beliefs. There religion
is often powerless to restrain men in the midst of innumerable temptations
which fortune offers. It cannot moderate their eagerness to enrich them-
selves, which everything contributes to arouse, but it reins supreme in the
souls of the women, and it is women who shape mores. Certainly of all the
countries of the world America is the one in which the marriage tie is most
respected and where the highest and truest conception of conjugal happi-
ness has been conceived. 90
To the religious republican, religion was necessary for the survival
of the Republic, and women, in their role as the head of the domestic
household, were essential to religion. Regulation of the "domestic rela-
tion" was something "which every age has demanded; which every na-
tion has practiced; which is necessary for the good of the whole
community, and even for the protection of and advantage of those for
whom its restraints are intended." 91 The virtue of society depended on
the virtue of women and the influence of that virtue exerted in the home.
According to Mr. Nelson, society
was designed that [woman] should give her whole heart in exchange for the
undivided affection of man, and become his partner in lawful marriage. En-
throned in the domestic circle, she becomes our refuge amidst the storms
and conflicts of life, and sheds a halo of happiness around the joys of
home.92
In this respect, women and the virtue they inculcated in society were a
"public good."' 93
"[W]oman," according to Joseph Hopkinson, "is inseparably con-
nected with everything that civilizes, refines, and sublimates man."94
the First Amendment. See, ag., CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 190 app. (remarks of Mr.
Nelson).
90 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 54, at 291. Thomas Jefferson also noted, though with a negative
connotation, the special role of women in 19th-century religion. See Letter from Jefferson to Dr.
Cooper, supra note 39, at 1464.
91 CONG. GLOBE., 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1494 (1860) (remarks of Mr. Millson).
92 Id. at 194 app. (remarks of Mr. Nelson).
93 WooD, supra note 50, at 357.
94 Id. (quoting Joseph Hopkinson, Annual Discourse, delivered before the Pennsylvania Acad-
emy of the Fine Arts (1819)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Gordon Wood de-
scribes the 19th century practice in which "wives and mothers were.., urged to use their special
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Thus, it is not surprising to find Representative Nelson proposing that
the antipolygamy law be passed "in the name of the respectable and vir-
tuous women of the United States." 95 Indeed, far from "interfering"
with the domestic relations in the territories, the proposed legislation was
intended to protect the domestic institution of marriage96 and thereby to
protect the republic's crucial source of public virtue.
(b) Polygamy and the First Amendment.-As evidenced in the
bill's proviso, 97 Congress was aware that the proposed legislation might
conflict with the "rights of conscience"-a phrase linked to the religion
clauses of the First Amendment. 98 While Congress could have argued
that it had plenary authority in the territories and was thus unrestrained
by the Bill of Rights in that arena,99 this argument was never made. By
explicitly stating in the law itself that it was not to be construed in a way
that might violate the "right to worship God according to the dictates of
conscience," while at the same time criminalizing a religious practice, the
law provides insight into the contemporary understanding of the scope of
constitutionally protected religious liberty.
The idea that free exercise of religion might require immunity from
laws passed for the public good was a "pernicious philosophy."100 In
fact, the very idea seems anomalous in an age when most viewed religion
as a necessary safeguard against the dangers of a radically individualized
society. 101
[I]t seems to me that there would be just as much logic and as much propri-
talents to cultivate in their husbands and children the proper moral feelings-the virtue, benevo-
lence, and social affections-necessary to hold a sprawling and competitive republican society to-
gether." Id.
95 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 194 app. (1860) (remarks of Mr. Nelson).
96 Id. at 198-99 app. (remarks of Mr. Simms).
97 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
98 The quotation in the proviso probably comes from the 1849 Constitution of the State of Dese-
ret (better known as Mormon-controlled Utah Territory) which read:
All men shall have a natural and inalienable right to worship God according to the dictates of
their own consciences, and the General Assembly shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or of prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF DESERET (1849), reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 375, 380 (William F. Swindler ed., 1973-79) [hereinafter SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS]; see also Madison, supra note 25, at 146 (describing the First Amendment reli-
gion clauses as securing the "liberty of conscience").
99 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, para. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States .... ).
100 Mr. Pryor of Virginia, for example, explicitly rejected the principle of religious exemptions
under the First Amendment on the grounds that "this argument, if sound in principle, will avail to
cover any abomination which affects a religious character. It will suffice for the protection of Thug-
ism or Suttee, as well as polygamy. Plainly, then, it is an unsound argument and a pernicious philos-
ophy which conducts to such absurd and mischievous consequences." CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1496 (1860).
101 See WOOD, supra note 50, at 332-34 (noting the 19th century's reliance on religion to incul-
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ety in asserting that any given number of men might band themselves to-
gether as robbers, murderers, and thieves, and call that their religion, as to
say that the people of Utah can, by joining together under the designation
of "Latter Day Saints," claim an especial protection under the provisions of
the laws of the United States.10 2
Although religion was essential to society, religious freedom could never
be invoked to justify "licentious" behavior.10 3 To nineteenth-century
religious republicans, the scope of both the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses was limited by the majority's concern with the virtue and
good order of society.
4. Removing a Doctrinal Barrier Against Religious Exemptions.-
Although religious republicanism rejected the concept of religious ex-
emptions from generally applicable laws, it nevertheless opened the door
to a new understanding of the values underlying the religion clauses. By
recognizing the peculiar status of religion in a democracy, religious re-
publicanism removed a doctrinal barrier against attempts to protect the
free exercise of religion. Where separationists might reject special pro-
cate the virtue necessary to sustain a democracy in the face of the radical individualism that grew out
of the Revolution and the First Great Awakening). Tocqueville was also concerned with how to
sustain public morality in a society based on equality and individualism. See Marvin Zetterbaum,
Alexis de Tocqueville, in HIsTORY OF PoLrrICAL PHILOSOPHY 761, 778 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Crop-
sey eds., 1987).
102 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 app. (1860) (remarks of Mr. Nelson); see also id. at
1514 (remarks of Mr. McClernand) ("[Mormonism] combines all the incentives which can appeal to
the passions of bad men. It concedes to the sensual many wives; to the military adventurer the
distinctions of military position; and to the priest abundant tithes and perfect impunity to the civil
authority."); id at 191 app. (remarks of Mr. Nelson) (the Mormons are "a set of fiends, who know
no mercy, no law, but who murder and plunder at will").
As the above quotes imply, animosity against the Mormons went beyond distaste for their do-
mestic arrangements. Indeed, public reaction against the Mormons did not begin with the endorse-
ment of polygamy. As early as the 1830s, mobs had razed a Mormon newspaper and tarred a
Mormon Bishop in Missouri. See 2 STOKES, supra note 47, at 42. Polygamy, on the other hand, was
not "revealed" to Joseph Smith until 1843 and not publicly advocated until after his death in 1847.
Id. at 47. It was to escape the same persecutions that resulted in Smith's death that led the
Mormons to Utah in the first place. See Laycock, supra note 83, at 416.
Mere prejudice against a new and unorthodox faith explains a great deal of the reaction against
the Mormons. Nevertheless, however predisposed the majority was to find fault with the Mormons,
the practice of polygamy would have struck a nerve deep in the psyche of the religious republicans
regardless of the practitioners. The fact that it was practiced by a group already targeted by the
majority no doubt made the reaction that much more pronounced.
103 Thus, Pryor's belief that protecting polygamy under the free exercise clause would be stretch-
ing that Amendment too far:
Sir, there is something shockingly incongruous in the association of the polygamous practices of
a barbarous age and a debased people with the Christian civilization of the nineteenth century
and the chastened liberties of this enlightened nation.... [The Mormons] are a reproach in the
eyes of the nations-a reproach upon civil liberty, as exhibiting to what extravagance of licen-
tious development republican institutions may conduce; and a reproach upon religious freedom,
as betraying the excesses of depravity which may flourish under shelter of indiscriminate tolera-
tion.
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1496 (1860).
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tections as "laws respecting religion," the religious republicans believed
that legislation supporting religion qua religion did not necessarily vio-
late the Establishment Clause and might even be required. This insight
would play a crucial role in the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
when the religious republican duty to support and protect the religious
exercise of the majority would be transformed into the duty to support
and protect the free exercise of the individual.
That day, however, had not yet arrived. Even if religion had a spe-
cial role in a democracy, that role was defined by the majority-religion
had no right to claim exemption from laws passed in pursuit of the com-
mon good. This majoritarian approach to religious rights required coop-
eration on the part of the religious community. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that until the 1830s, the majority of religious faiths went out of
their way to avoid conflicts with the civil government:
I have said that American priests proclaim themselves in general terms in
favor of civil liberties without excepting even those who do not admit reli-
gious freedom; but none of them lend their support to any particular polit-
ical system. They are at pains to keep out of affairs and not mix in the
combination of parties. 04
We might call this religious accommodation of the government.
There would be no need, no call, for religious exemptions as long as reli-
gion remained accommodating. Religion did not.
B. Expanding the Sphere of Religion: The Rise of Religious Social
Activism
Religion was not immune to the heady individualism that character-
ized post-Revolutionary America. In the First Great Awakening,
"[r]evivalist clergymen urged the people to trust only in 'self-examina-
tion' and their own private judgments."10 5 The Second Great Awaken-
ing, which occurred in the first decades of the nineteenth century,
expanded on these same ideas. According to Baptist evangelist Elias
Smith, the people were "wholly free to examine for ourselves what is
truth, without being bound to a catechism, creed, confession of faith,
discipline or any rule excepting the scriptures."' 1 6 The impact of this
individualistic gospel impressed contemporary political theorists. James
Mill, in his Essay on Government, described how "[t]he power of personal
interpretation of the Bible, without priestly guidance, 'has totally altered
the condition of human nature and exalted man to what may be called a
104 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 54, at 291; see also Hamburger, supra note 11, at 943-46 (noting
that, at the Founding, neither dissenters nor established churches sought to be exempt from civil
laws).
105 WooD, supra note 50, at 145.
106 Id. at 332 (quoting ELIAS SMITH, THE LOVING KINDNESS OF GOD DISPLAYED IN THE TRI-
UMPH OF REPUBLICANISM IN AMERICA (1809)).
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different stage of existence.' o107
This radical individualism led to a massive fragmentation among the
denominations. 10 8 As the influence of denominations waned, evangelists
like Lyman Beecher feared that nothing protected "society against de-
pravity within and temptation without" except the force of God's law
"written upon the heart of each individual."10 9 Only the moral character
of individuals remained to hold together an unruly and splintered soci-
ety.110 According to Gordon Wood, "[to be successful in America, reli-
gion had to pre-occupy itself with morality." ' To the dismay of
separationists like Jefferson and Madison, 112 the clergy took their new-
found responsibility for society's character to heart and formed societies
against, among other things, gambling, drinking, Sabbath-breaking, pro-
fanity, and horse racing.113 Rejecting both separationist and religious
republican admonitions that religion remain aloof from political affairs,
the religious activists of the nineteenth century invaded the public arena
on an unprecedented scale.
Of course, the issue that would occasion the greatest conflict be-
tween religion and government was slavery. Here, the separationist be-
lief that the overlap of church and state would be so minor as to involve
only "unessential points" became demonstrably untenable. Moreover,
the suppression of slave religion would provide the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment with clear examples of why a second adoption of the
Free Exercise Clause was necessary.
III. THE ABOLITIONISTS AND THE SUPPRESSION OF SLAVE
RELIGION
A. The Abolitionists
Abolitionism had its roots in the evangelistic movements arising out
of the Second Great Awakening. 14 To the religiously inspired abolition-
107 Timothy Fuller, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 101, at 710, 728 (quoting James Mill, An Essay on Government (1820)).
108 WooD, supra note 50, at 332-33.
109 Id. at 333 (quoting Lyman Beecher, The Necessity of Revivals of Religion to the Perpetuity of
Our Civil and Religious Institutions, THE SPIRIT OF THE PILGRIMS (1831)).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 366-69 (describing the Founders' gloomy reaction to the rise of evangelical Christianity
and the decline of enlightenment separation of church and state). Jefferson in particular was trou-
bled by the rise of "fanatical" evangelicalism. See Letter from Jefferson to Dr. Cooper, supra note
39, at 1464.
113 WOOD, supra note 50, at 335.
114 Of particular importance was the religious revival begun under Charles G. Finney in Western
New York in 1824-25, whose converts went on to play a major role in abolitionism. 2 STOKES, supra
note 47, at 145. Those influenced by Finney's preaching included Theodore Dwight Weld and the
"New York Philanthropists" whose money financed a great many abolitionist activities. Id. The
revivals discarded the self-absorption of Calvinism and embraced a more liberal theology that "laid
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ist,115 slavery was an affront to the laws of God 1 6 and was "irreconcila-
ble with the manifested will of our Great Creator, and with the
imperative declaration of our blessed Savior 'all things whatsoever ye
would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the
law and the prophets.' "117 William Lloyd Garrison went so far as to
claim that because of its seeming endorsement of slavery, the Constitu-
tion itself was "a covenant with death and an agreement with Hell."1 18
When efforts to free the slaves conflicted with the laws of the state, the
more radical abolitionists exhorted the people to conform to a higher
law. 119
Believing God would deny his blessing to a nation that permitted
slavery, the abolitionists embarked on a campaign to convert the coun-
try. In 1835, antislavery forces sent tracts by the hundreds to southern
clergymen and postmasters with the direction that they be distributed in
their communities. 120 In New England, the "Conscience Whigs" joined
abolitionists in issuing a tract in which clergy were "entreated in the
name of God and Christ to pray for the slave; and preach at least one
sermon against the admission of Texas as a slave state, as soon as may
emphasis on the fact that salvation was the beginning of religious experience rather than its end, and
that converts must begin a new life .. ." Id. The faithful were encouraged to do benevolent social
work and "not merely to try to increase their personal religious life." Id. The revivals actually
inspired two movements having to do with the slaves: the "colonizationalists" and the more radical
"abolitionists." Id. The abolitionists themselves were encouraged by the work of William Wilber-
force and Thomas Clarkson, who led the movement to abolish slavery in the British Empire, suc-
ceeding in 1833. Id. at 146.
115 Slavery, of course, could be opposed on a variety of grounds. As this Article is concerned
with conflicts between religion and politics, it focuses on the arguments of those abolitionists who
believed slavery violated the religious conscience.
116 See United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551)
(Joseph Story declaring that the slave trade was illegal in America because it was "repugnant to the
great principles of Christian duty, the dictates of natural religion, the obligations of good faith and
morality, and the eternal maxims of social justice"); see also 3-4 [THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35] G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 677 (1988).
117 Address to the Citizens of the State of Ohio, Concerning What Are Called The Black Laws
(Issued in Behalf of the Society of Friends of Indiana Yearly Meeting, 1848) reprinted in SLAVERY,
RACE, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 1700-1872, SER. No. 7, 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY:
THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 101, 101 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988) [hereinafter STATUTES ON
SLAVERY].
118 2 STOKES, supra note 47, at 190.
119 See S.G. HOWE, SLAVERY AT WASHINGTON, reprinted in SLAVERY, RACE, AND THE AMERI-
CAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 1700-1872, SER. No. 4, 2 SLAVE REBELS, ABOLITIONISTS, AND SOUTHERN
COURTS: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 445, 463 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988) [hereinafter SLAVE
REBELS]; see also REV. W. BEARDSLEY, NARRATIVE AND FACTS, RESPECTING ALANSON WORK,
JA. E. BURR AND GEO. THOMPSON, PRISONERS IN THE MISSOURI PENITENTIARY, FOR THE AL-
LEGED CRIME OF NEGRO STEALING (1842), reprinted in 2 SLAVE REBELS, supra, at 1, 23 ("By what
rule is [assisting runaway slaves] justifiable? By the commands of the bible, and the whole spirit of
the gospel.").
120 2 STOKES, supra note 47, at 153.
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be." 121 Beginning with the words "[iln the Name of Almighty God" and
bearing the names of 3050 New England clergymen, a two hundred foot
long memorial against the extension of slavery was presented to Con-
gress. 122 Within a few months, 125 separate remonstrances came from
the ministers of these New England states.123 Not only had the Second
Great Awakening changed the conception of the proper sphere of reli-
gion generally, but it had now become the specific duty of the abolition-
ists to fight what they believed was an ungodly political institution.
Religion was invading the "sphere" of government with a vengeance.
B. The Southern Suppression of Religious Exercise
Southern governments were not disposed to take the invasion
lightly. Less than a decade after Finney's religious campaign that so in-
spired religious interest in government activities,1 24 an event occurred in
Virginia that would inspire southern governments to become extremely
interested in religious activities.1 25 On August 22, 1831, a group of slaves
headed by Nat Turner began a bloody rebellion in which seventy whites
were killed before Turner and his group were captured.1 26 The fact that
Turner was a preacher confirmed Southern suspicions that religion, if left
unregulated, could be used to dangerously subversive ends. Not only
would the religious exercise of blacks in the South have to be closely
monitored and controlled, but also religious sentiments flowing in from
the North would have to be stanched lest slaves be incited to follow the
example of the Reverend Turner. What emerged was a complex and
highly regulated system of religious exercise-a system so abhorrent to
121 NOONAN, supra note 32, at 170 (quoting How To SETTLE THE TEXAS QUESTION (1845)).
122 2 STOKES, supra note 47, at 153.
123 Id. Southern Congressmen were so offended by the efforts of the abolitionists that they initi-
ated the so-called "gag rules," temporarily banning such petitions from being received in Congress.
See 1 [SECESSIONISTS AT BAY, 1776-1854] WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION
372-73 (1990). The rules remained in effect from 1832 to 1844. Id. at 351; see also CONG. GLOBE,
27th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28, 51, 63 (1841) (debates on the "gag rules").
124 See supra note 114.
125 In the slaveholding states, the relationship between the free exercise of religion (recognized in
the southern state constitutions) and slavery was problematic from the beginning. For example, in
1819, Rev. Jacob Gruber, a Methodist minister, was arrested for a sermon that some Maryland
residents thought might incite slaves to revolt. DAVID MARTIN, TRIAL OF THE REV. JACOB GRU-
BER, MINISTER IN THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, AT THE MARCH TERM, 1819, IN THE
FREDERICK COUNTY COURT, FOR A MISDEMEANOR (1819), reprinted in 1 SLAVE REBELS, supra
note 119, at 1, 3-5. In his sermon Gruber attacked cruel masters and pronounced slavery to be
against the fundamental principles of Christianity; nevertheless, slaves were to be obedient to their
masters lest they follow them to Hell. Id. at 17-20. Gruber's defense to the incitement charge was
that he had a right to preach any doctrine that was not "immoral" or "contrary to the peace and
good order of society." Id. at 34-35. Rev. Gruber was acquitted, in part because there was no
evidence he had broken any laws. Id. at 5. Ironically, Gruber was defended by Roger B. Taney, the
man who, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, would author the Dred Scott decision. See id. at
32.
126 1 FREEHLING, supra note 123, at 178-81.
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members of the Thirty-ninth Congress that its abolition was explicitly
cited as one of the purposes behind the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Direct Regulation of Religious Exercise.-In response to the
Turner uprising, laws were passed that directly impinged upon certain
types of religious activities. For instance, in many southern states it was
a crime, punishable by death, to "write, print, publish or distribute" abo-
litionist literature. 127 Persons found with abolitionist pamphlets or books
were subject to public lashings, regardless of whether the literature had
been distributed. 128  Those who attacked slavery through sermons,
speeches, or written documents risked death by law129 or at the hands of
proslavery mobs. 130 The mail, with the assistance of southern federal
postmasters, was "cleansed" of letters seeking to convert slaveholders to
antislavery Christianity.13 1 Congress itself, at the insistence of southern
Democrats, instituted "gag rules," whereby antislavery petitions would
be received, but immediately rejected.132
Direct burdens on free exercise in the South went beyond mere
prohibitions of "incendiary" language or literature. Black religious as-
semblies were heavily regulated with severe punishments authorized for
improper religious gatherings. 133 Slaves were not permitted to have their
127 See, e.g., DIGEST OF THE LAWS RELATIVE TO SLAVES AND PEOPLE OF FREE COLOUR IN
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA (Published by the Louisiana Constitutional and Anti-Fanatical Society
1835) [hereinafter DIGEST], reprinted in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY, supra note 117, at 47, 68. The
law specifically targeted "any thing having a tendency to produce discontent among the free col-
oured population of the State, or insubordination among the slaves therein." Id.
128 See 2 STOKES, supra note 47, at 151.
129 In Louisiana, language from the pulpit having the "tendency" to "produce discontent among
the free coloured population of this State, or to incite insubordination among the slaves therein" was
punishable by death or imprisonment. DIGEST, supra note 127, at 68.
130 For example, the Rev. Elijah Pomeroy Lovejoy, editor of the Observer, a St. Louis religious
journal that attacked slavery, had his presses destroyed by proslavery mobs three times. On Novem-
ber -, 1837, while defending his fourth press from destruction, he and one of his companions were
killed. See 2 STOKES, supra note 47, at 36.
131 See 1 FREEHLING, supra note 123, at 290-91. Believing that such appeals were a disguised call
for black revolution, Charleston Postmaster Huger locked up the "insurrectionary sheets" and
sought guidance from President Jackson in Washington. Id. at 291. Jackson directed the sheets be
held until the recipients demanded delivery, and their names taken down and published "thru the
Publick journals as subscribers to this wicked plan of exciting the negroes to insurrection and to
massacre." Id.
132 Id. at 372-73; see supra note 123.
133 In South Carolina, it was unlawful for "assemblies of slaves, free negroes, mulattoes and mes-
tizoes" to meet "in a confined or secret place," the magistrate being authorized to "inflict such
corporal punishment, not exceeding twenty lashes, upon such slaves, free negroes, &c., as they may
judge necessary for deterring them from the like unlawful assemblage in the future." GEORGE M.
STROUD, SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (1827), reprinted in 1 STATUTES ON SLAVERY, supra note 117, at 157, 245
(citing 2 BREVARD'S DIGEST). In the District of Columbia, "all meetings for religious worship,
beyond the hour of ten o'clock at night, of free negroes, mulattoes or slaves, shall be and they are
hereby declared to be unlawful." WORTHINGTON G. SNETHEN, THE BLACK CODE OF THE DIs-
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own ministers or to worship without the presence of a white man.13 4
Even when a religious gathering received the state's imprimatur, the con-
tent of the sermon was dictated by proslavery Christian ideology with the
message invariably focused on the biblical admonition that slaves "obey
their masters."135
2. Indirect Regulation of Religious Exercise. -In addition to laws
that directly regulated or prohibited certain religious activities, numerous
laws were passed that indirectly burdened the most basic religious free-
doms. For example, laws prohibiting the assembly of blacks at night for
any purpose had an unavoidable impact on black religious assemblies. 136
Of course, the "generally applicable" law having the greatest impact on
free exercise in the South was the prohibition against teaching slaves how
to read and write.137 This prevented slaves from reading the Bible.138
TRICT OF COLUMBIA IN FORCE SEPTEMBER 1ST, 1848 (A. & F. Antislavery Society, 1848), reprinted
in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY, supra note 117, at 179, 224 (reprinting and quoting ORDINANCES OF
THE CORPORATION OF WASHINGTON (Oct. 29, 1836)); see also THE PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF
MRS. MARGARET DOUGLASS, A SOUTHERN WOMAN, WHO WAS IMPRISONED FOR ONE MONTH IN
THE COMMON JAIL OF NORFOLK, UNDER THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FOR THE CRIME OF TEACHING
FREE COLORED CHILDREN TO READ (1854) [hereinafter DOUGLASS NARRATIVE], reprinted in 2
SLAVE REBELS, supra note 119, at 373, 435 (quoting Virginia Code of 1833, § 31) ("Every assem-
blage of negroes for the purpose of religious worship, when such worship is conducted by a negro,
and every assemblage of negroes for the purpose of instruction in reading or writing, or in the night-
time for any purpose, shall be an unlawful assembly.").
134 See 2 STOKES, supra note 47, at 194.
135 A slave's Christian duty to obey her master was a major theme in the sermons and writings of
antebellum southern clergymen. Focusing on the letters of St. Paul, particularly Ephesians 6:5-8,
Colossians 3:22, and Philemon, southern theologians provided a biblical justification for slave obedi-
ence. See 3 THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS 435 n.17 (C. Peter Ripley ed., 1991) [hereinafter
ABOLITIONIST PAPERS].
136 See STROUD, supra note 133, at 244-45 (citing Virginia Revised Code of 1819).
137 Typical was the Louisiana statute of 1835 declaring that "all persons who shall teach, or
permit or cause to be taught, any slave in this State to read or write, shall, on conviction thereof,
before any court of competent jurisdiction be imprisoned not less than one month nor more than
twelve months." DIGEST, supra note 127, at 68; see also NEGRO LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA (John
B. O'Neall ed., 1848), reprinted in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY, supra note 117, at 139; DOUGLASS
NARRATIVE, supra note 133, at 435 (quoting Virginia Code of 1833, § 32) ("If a white person assem-
ble with negroes for the purposes of instructing them to read or write, or if he associate with them in
an unlawful assembly, he shall be confined in jail not exceeding six months, and fined not exceeding
one hundred dollars."). Prohibitions on slave literacy were in place long before the Civil War. As
early as 1740, North Carolina had a statute directing that any person who "teach or cause any slave
or slaves to be taught to write, or shall use or employ any slave as a scribe in any manner of writing
whatsoever hereafter taught to write" shall "forfeit the sum of one hundred pounds current money."
STROUD, supra note 133, at 244 (quoting 2 BREVARD'S DIGEST).
138 The prohibition included those instructors who otherwise supported slavery. In 1853, Mrs.
Margaret Douglass of Norfolk, Virginia was accused of "unlawful assembly" (teaching slaves to read
and write). See DOUGLASS NARRATIVE, supra note 133, at 387. Mrs. Douglass began her defense
by declaring, "I have been a slaveholder myself, and, if circumstances rendered it necessary or prac-
ticable, I might be such again." Id. at 379. Nevertheless, "I deem it the duty of every Southerner,
morally and religiously, to instruct his slaves, that they may know their duty to their masters, and to
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The South, sensitive to Northern accusations that slavery prohibited
the free exercise of religion,139 pointed to their practice of allowing "oral
instruction" of the slaves whereby "[a]ll the knowledge which is neces-
sary to salvation, all the knowledge of our duty toward God, and our
duty toward our neighbor, may be communicated. . ., and therefore a
law of the land interdicting other means of instruction does not trench
upon the law of God."'140 Thus, the slaveholders had hit upon a means of
supporting and encouraging religious exercise, while at the same time
ensuring that only "true Christianity" was inculcated in the slaves-all
this through oral instruction which, although it may conflict with some
aspects of religious exercise, entrenched upon only "unessential
points." 141
C. The Abolitionist Critique
Despite Southern protestations to the contrary, northern abolition-
their common God." Id. at 407. Mrs. Douglass was convicted of unlawful assembly and served one
month in jail. Id. at 418-19.
139 South Carolina Judge John Belton O'Neall, for example, reported to the state assembly that
laws prohibiting black religious assemblies after nine o'clock at night ought to be repealed. "They
operate as a reproach upon us in the mouths of our enemies, in that we do not afford our slaves that
free worship of God, which he demands for all his people." NEGRO LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
supra note 137, at 140.
140 Luther P. Jackson, Religious Instruction of Negroes, 1830-1860, with Special Reference to
South Carolina, 15 J. NEGRO HIsT. 72 (1930), reprinted in RELIGION AND SLAVERY, supra note 83,
at 190, 197 (quoting editor of The Churchman, a contemporary publication of the Episcopal church).
The institution of oral instruction was excoriated by abolitionists as both inadequate protection of
the right of free exercise, as well as a bald-faced attempt by the slaveholder to control the content of
religious information getting to the slave. According to James McClune Smith:
[The Southern] churches grant nothing but oral instruction to the slaves, whom they do not
teach to read the Bible. And may I not be excused from calling that "Christian fellowship,"
which expressly denies the common rights of men to those whom they have enrolled as breth-
ren? Are those churches, wherein bishops, priests and deacons, ministers, and preachers who
perfusi sanie vittas atroque veneno their hands bound and their utterance choked, whilst in their
ministrations before the alter, not of God, but of slavery, they croak the changes upon "Servants
obey your masters"?
Letter from James McClune Smith to Horace Greeley (Jan. 29, 1844), in 3 ABOLITIONIST PAPERS,
supra note 135, at 430, 435 (the latin is from Virgil's Aeneid, bk. 2, line 221, translated by Smith as
"priestly headbands drenched with gore and venom."); see also Testimony by Lewis Hayden, deliv-
ered at the Massachusetts State House (Feb. 13, 1855), reprinted in 4 ABOLITIONIST PAPERS, supra
note 135, at 266, 266 ("It is true sir, I sometimes of my own free will, and sometimes by compulsion,
attended what my brother calls 'a church' and heard the 'Missionary' to whom he has alluded
preach that Gospel which is so peculiar to the South-Servant obey thy masterr This is the sum
total of the 'Gospel' which slaves have preached unto them."); HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, THE
KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 38 (Boston, J.P. Jewett 1853).
141 Not only had southern state governments taken religious republicanism to its logical conclu-
sion by engaging in pervasive regulation of minority religious exercise, but Southern religious de-
nominations played their part as well. At the same time that political majorities were suppressing
religious dissent, many Southern denominations were declaring neutrality on the subject of slavery.
See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 40 (1972). For
example, in 1861, the Presbyterian Church of the C.S.A. announced: "We have no right, as a
Church, to enjoin [slavery] as a duty, or to condemn it as a sin." Id.
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ists saw the cumulative effect of laws circumscribing black assemblies,
"incendiary language," and the ability to read and write as devastating
slaves' ability to exercise their religious faith. Violation of religious free-
dom was seized upon by abolitionists and proclaimed as one of the great-
est evils of the peculiar institution. 142
It was not simply a matter of equal protection-it would be as un-
reasonable to the abolitionist to prohibit all from reading the Bible as it
was to prohibit only the slave. What was being denied was "access to
that heavenly chart, which is laid down by Jehovah as the only safe rule
of faith and practice, the liberty of reading and understanding how he
may serve God acceptably." 143 Denying access to the Bible was an of-
fense over and above mere political deprivations-it was its own justifica-
tion for the abolition of slavery.'4
If the original Free Exercise Clause was intended to prohibit noth-
ing more than laws that targeted religion qua religion, the abolitionists
challenged the adequacy of that protection. Laws preventing blacks
from learning to read the Bible were no less violations of religious liberty
because the abridgement was the result of a religiously neutral law. The
abolitionists thus joined a growing chorus of voices calling for a broader
interpretation of the original Bill of Rights, one that emphasized the
rights of the individual over the prerogatives of state majorities.
IV. REINTERPRETING THE WORDS OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. Reinterpreting the Federalist First Amendment
In Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,145 the Supreme Court held that the
protection of the Bill of Rights bound only the federal government, not
states or municipalities. In Permoli v. City of New Orleans,1 46 the Court
upheld the conviction of a Roman Catholic priest for violating a city
ordinance making it unlawful to expose dead bodies to public view (the
142 See Letter from Charles Sumner to John Jay (May 25, 1843), in 1 THE SELECTED LETTERS
OF CHARLES SUMNER 129, 129-30 (Beverly W. Palmer ed., 1990) ("Is it not strange that the
Church, or any body of men, upon whom the faintest ray of Christianity has fallen, should endeavor
to exclude the African, 'guilty of a skin not coloured as their own,' from the freest participation in
the privileges of worshipping the common God?-It would seem as if prejudice, irrational, as it is
uncharitable, could no further go."); see also Speech by Henry Highland Garnet, delivered before the
National Convention of Colored Citizens, Buffalo, New York (Aug. 16, 1843), in 3 ABOLrTONIsT
PAPERS, supra note 135, at 403, 406 ("Nearly three millions of your fellow citizens, are prohibited by
law.., from reading the Book of Life.").
143 Speech by Charles W. Gardner, delivered at the Broadway Tabernacle, New York, New York
(May 9, 1837), in 3 ABOLITIoNIsT PAPERS, supra note 135, at 206.
144 See id. at 211 ("See then, the wickedness of those laws which go contrary to the law of God,
and say to the slave, 'You shall not read these Scriptures, nor understand them, nor teach them to
your children, nor obey them.' Is it not morally right, and politically safe, to abolish such a
system?").
145 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
146 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
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priest had blessed the deceased at a Catholic funeral mass). Echoing
Barron, the Court held:
The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the re-
spective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions
and laws: nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the
United States in this respect on the states. 147
Even if it did not directly bind the states, however, the Bill of Rights
could still be viewed as expressing certain fundamental rights of individu-
als. As Professor Akhil Amar has pointed out, lawyers and judges of the
nineteenth century, unlike us with our modem positivist approach to
law, looked not only to statutes and constitutions, but also to codes,
charters, and legal precedents "in an effort to distill their animating prin-
ciples-the spirit of the common law."' 48 Even as it functioned as a
structural document delineating the powers reserved to the states, the
First Amendment could also serve as a declaration that certain funda-
mental "rights" and "freedoms" preexisted the Constitution.149
For example, even if not "legally" bound to do so, state judges could
look to the First Amendment for guidance in interpreting the free exer-
cise provisions in their own constitutions.' 50 Federal judges, although
precluded from applying the Bill of Rights directly against the states,
might do so indirectly. For example, state constitutional provisions
could be interpreted by reference to the First Amendment.15 1 More sig-
nificantly, state constitutional provisions that seemed to run afoul of nat-
ural rights could be struck down by way of other clauses in the
Constitution that did apply against the states. Arguing against a state
constitutional amendment that prevented clergy from exercising ministe-
rial functions without first swearing they had been loyal in the recent
Civil War, Reverdy Johnson conceded that
[t]he Constitution of the United States, to be sure, so far as the article which
proclaims that there shall be no interference with religion is concerned, is
147 Id. at 609.
148 Amar, supra note 23, at 1205.
149 Id. at 1205-06.
150 For example, Mayer Clinton in People v. Philips explicitly looked to the federal Constitution
for guidance in interpreting state law. See 1 STOKES, supra note 47, at 849 (quoting from the court's
decision) ('[U]ntil men under pretense of religion, act counter to the fundamental principles of mo-
rality, and endanger the well being of the state, they are to be protected in the free exercise of their
religion.... They are protected by the laws and constitution of this country, in the full and free
exercise of their religion.") (emphasis added). For an explanation of the case, see supra note 77.
151 While riding on circuit, Supreme Court Justice Henry Baldwin rejected recent holdings of
Pennsylvania's highest court, as well as contrary pronouncements by the state legislature, and held
that the constitution and laws of Pennsylvania required allowing unincorporated religious groups to
take property by devise. Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 8952). To guide
him in determining the common law of Pennsylvania, Justice Baldwin explicitly looked to the federal
Constitution. Id. at 423 ("[W]hen we add to these [common-law rights of religious organizations),
those expressly secured to them by the constitutions of the state and Union, we cannot doubt that
they are as inviolable as a charter could make them.").
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not obligatory upon the State of Missouri; but it announces a great principle
of American liberty, a principle deeply seated in the American mind...
that as between a man and his conscience, as relates to his obligations to
God, it is not only tyrannical but unchristian to interfere. It is almost in-
conceivable that in this civilized day the doctrines contained in this [state]
constitution should be considered as within the legitimate sphere of human
power.152
Mr. Johnson's belief that persons had a natural right to exercise their
religion free from government interference was more than adversarial
rhetoric. We have already seen that Congress explicitly sought to avoid
running afoul of the Free Exercise Clause when it passed the anti-
polygamy laws. 153 If the First Amendment was understood as a declara-
tion of states' rights, religious exercise in the territories would be a
matter of congressional policy, not constitutional constraint.
The federal government was not alone in its reinterpretation of the
originally federalist First Amendment. The 1849 Constitution of the
152 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 313 (1866). In Cummings, the Supreme Court
struck down on ex post facto grounds an amendment to the Missouri Constitution that prevented
clergy from teaching or preaching in the state without having first taken an oath swearing they had
been loyal to the Union in the recent Civil War. Id. The Court held that states may not "under the
form of creating a qualification or attaching a condition .... inflict a punishment for a past act which
was not punishable at the time it was committed." Id. at 319. The oath requirement was a punish-
ment because "[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punish-
ment." Id. at 320. Presumably, the right to preach was a civil right. In reaching its conclusion, the
Court explicitly invoked natural law: "The theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that
all men have certain inalienable rights-that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness; and that in the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike open to
every one, and that in the protection of these rights all are equal before the law. Any deprivation or
suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is punishment, and can be in no otherwise de-
fined." Id. at 321-22.
The fact that Cummings recognized a natural right to pursue one's religious mission in the face
of contrary state law appears to conflict with the Court's earlier holding in Permoli. See supra text
accompanying note 146. The conflict was not lost on Justice Miller, who, in his dissent, compared
the facts of Cummings with the facts of Permoli and noted, "I leave the two cases to speak for
themselves." 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 398 (Miller, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Cummings was cited in
the Forty-second Congress for the proposition that the right to preach the gospel is one of the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. See CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 762
(1872) (remarks of Matthew Carpenter).
153 Recall that the law criminalizing polygamy carried a proviso: "[P]rovided that this act shall
be so limited and construed as not to affect or interfere with the right of property legally acquired
under the ordinance heretofore mentioned, nor the right 'to worship God according to the dictates of
conscience,'...." CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1410 (1860).
The proviso begins by protecting the right to property in the Territories, a subject recently
addressed by the Taney Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). By coupling
the right to property with the rights of conscience, the drafters of the proviso signaled their belief
that both were protected within the territories by the federal Constitution. Justice Taney himself
expressed this view in Dred Scott. See id. at 450 ("[No one, we presume, will contend that Congress
can make any law in a Territory respecting the establishment of religion or the free exercise
thereof.").
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State of Deseret (better known as Mormon-controlled Utah Territory)
contained the following provision:
All men shall have a natural and inalienable right to worship God accord-
ing to the dictates of their own consciences, and the General Assembly shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or of prohibiting the
free exercise thereof....t54
Similarly, a group drafting a constitution for Jefferson Territory (in what
is now the state of Colorado) included a provision stating:
The General Assembly shall make no laws respecting an establishment of
religion, nor shall any religious test be required of any citizen; neither shall
any one be required to support any sect or denomination. 155
Finally, in 1846, Iowa ratified a constitution which included the follow-
ing provision in its Bill of Rights:
The general assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.1 56
The language of the First Amendment now appeared, to the letter,
in both state and territorial constitutions. Words once intended to signal
a reservation of power to state majorities were now invoked to express
the rights of citizens against state majorities. In fact, the core value of
the Establishment Clause is transformed through its adoption into state
constitutions. The original Clause was establishment neutral, expressing
neither a preference for nor an opposition to existing religious establish-
ments. Once adopted by a state, however, the words lose their neutrality;
the core value is transformed from federalism to nonestablishment.
Words that once expressed the rights of states now expressed the rights
of individuals. 157
154 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF DESERET, supra note 98, at 380. Utah's draft constitution
of 1860 contained essentially the same provisions, including the language of the federal constitution.
9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 388.
155 CONSTITUTION OF JEFFERSON TERRITORY, art. I, § 3 (1859), reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 17, 18.
156 IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 3, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 552, 552-53 (Ben.
Perley Poore ed., Washington, Government Printing Office, 2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
157 This has implications for the long-standing debate over the original intention to incorporate
the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment. Assumed to be part of the Fourteenth
ever since Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), incorporation of the Establishment
Clause has been criticized on the ground that it makes no logical sense to incorporate against the
states a provision originally intendedfor the states. See William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Estab-
lishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1207
(1990) (incorporation of Establishment Clause "irrational"); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablish-
ment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 392 (1954) (arguing that the Estab-
lishment Clause could not be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment because, unlike the Free
Exercise Clause, "the [E]stablishment [C]lause imposed a political duty upon the federal government
without directly conferring a constitutional right upon the citizen"). If, by the time of the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the words of the Establishment Clause were thought to express
individual rights, the federalism argument loses its sting.
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B. Reinterpreting the Scope of Religious Liberty: The Militia
Exemptions
The clash between the abolitionists and the southern states dispelled
whatever remained of the idea that religion and government had separate
and distinct concerns. By the time of the Civil War, it was clear that the
spheres of church and state overlapped a great deal. More than just the
assumptions underlying the original religion clauses had changed; the
words themselves could now be read as declarations of individual rights.
These developments created new interpretive possibilities; perhaps reli-
gious exemptions rejected at the Founding now could be revisited with
different results. This appears to have happened in the case of exemp-
tions for the religiously scrupulous from military service.
1. State Constitutional Militia Exemptions.--Of the thirty-seven
states in existence at the end of the Civil War, twenty explicitly provided,
in one form or another, for exemption of the religiously scrupulous from
military service.15 8 Of those that did not explicitly provide for an exemp-
tion, most left open the possibility that the courts or the legislature might
mandate an exemption. 159 Interestingly, both of the exemptions written
at the beginning of the nineteenth century were placed in the bill of rights
158 See ALA. CONsT. of 1867, art. I: Declaration of Rights, § 29, reprinted in 1 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 82, 84; id. art. X, § 1; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 1, reprinted in
1 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 381, 395; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, re-
printed in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 497, 510; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. VIII,
§ 2, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 449, 463; IND. CONST.
of 1851, art. XII, § 6, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 156, at 512,
524; IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. VI, § 2, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 156, at 552, 561; KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 156, at 629, 638; Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. VII, § 1, reprinted in 4
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 166, 177-78; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. VII, § 5, re-
printed in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 788, 797; MICH. CONST. of
1850, art. XVII, § 1, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrruTIONS, supra note 156, at 995,
1010; N.H. CONST. of 1792, part I: Bill of Rights, art. 13, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 1294, 1295; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. XI, § 1, reprinted in 2
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 156, at 1351, 1365; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art.
XII, § 1, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 414, 429; OR. CONST. of 1857,
art. X, § 2, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 1492, 1502-03;
PA. CONST. of 1838, art. VI, § 2, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
156, at 1557, 1562; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art I: Declaration of Rights, § 30, reprinted in 8 SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 494, 496; TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. I: Declaration of Rights,
§ 28, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 171, 174; TENN. CONST. of 1870,
art. VIII, § 3, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 171, 183; TEx. CONST. of
1870, art. XVI, § 47, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 319, 349; VT.
CONST. of 1793, chap. I: Declaration of Rights, art. IX, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CON-
STITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 1875, 1876; VA. CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in 10
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 112, 134.
159 For example, the Mississippi Constitution of 1868 provided that "[a]ll able-bodied males...
shall be liable to military duty in the militia of this State, in such manner as the legislature shall
provide, not incompatible with this constitution and the Constitution and laws of the United States."
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or declaration of rights sections of their respective constitutions. 160
Thereafter, exemption clauses were written as part of general provisions
regarding the state militia.161 The idea that the exemption should be part
of the bill of rights reappeared after the Civil War when the exemption
was written into the bills of rights of three southern states seeking read-
mission into the Union. 162
By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, most
states had removed militia exemptions from the control of the majority.
Moreover, state constitutional conventions were writing the exemption
not only in those sections authorizing a state militia, but more compel-
lingly, in the state declaration of rights.
2. Military Exemptions During the Civil War.-Making religious
exemptions from military service a federal constitutional requirement
was considered and rejected at the time of the Founding. 163 Until the
Civil War, religious exemption from military duty was a matter of state
MIss. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 377,
386-87 (emphasis added).
160 See N.H. CONsT. of 1792, part I, art. 13, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS, supra note 156, at 1294, 1295; VT. CONST. of 1793, chap. I, art. IX, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 1875, 1876.
161 See supra note 158. Only one state constitution during this period removed an exemption.
The militia exemption in the 1820 Missouri Constitution, see Mo. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII: Decla-
ration of Rights, § 18, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 477, 488 ("That
no person who is religiously scrupulous of bearing arms can be compelled to do so, but may be
compelled to pay an equivalent for military service."), was removed under rather unusual circum-
stances. The State's governor, Claiborne Jackson, called a convention in 1861 for the purpose of
clarifying the state's constitutional position on the War. Before the convention could come to any
conclusions, Gov. Jackson issued a proclamation of "neutrality" and fled across Confederate lines.
The convention became the provisional government of the state and functioned as the "virtual civil
arm of the Union Armies crossing from Illinois to St. Louis." 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 98, at 465 (Introductory Note to Missouri Constitutions). A new convention was called in
1865, this one dominated by radicals seeking to impose a locally devised form of reconstruction in
the state. It was at this convention that the religious exemption was removed and replaced with the
following: "All able-bodied males.., shall be liable to military duty in the militia of this State; and
there shall be no exemption from such duty, except of such persons as the general assembly may, by
law, exempt." See Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. X, § 1, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 98, at 515, 532-33. Accordingly, it would be difficult to see the removal of the religious
exemption clause as reflective of either the will of the people of Missouri or the intentions of the civil
government in Washington. Indeed, the religious exemption clause was reintroduced in Missouri's
constitution of 1875. See Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. XIII, § 1, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND Docu-
MENTS, supra note 98, at 544, 573.
162 See ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. I: Declaration of Rights, § 29, reprinted in 1 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 82, 84; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art I: Declaration of Rights, § 30,
reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 494, 496; TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. I:
Declaration of Rights, § 28, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 171, 174.
163 See McConnell, supra note 8, at 1500-03. The Continental Congress had recommended ex-
emptions for the religiously scrupulous, but had no authority to make its recommendation law. Id.
at 1469.
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law and not an issue of national concern.164 It took the Civil War's insa-
tiable appetite for soldiers to raise the issue of conscientious objection to
a national level.165
At the start of the Civil War, northern troops came from state mili-
tias and volunteers.1 66 Despite liberal bounties, an insufficient number
volunteered, and in 1863, Congress enacted the first federal draft law. 167
No provision was made for the religiously scrupulous. In 1864, Senator
Henry Anthony responded to this deficiency by declaring the original
conscription act defective and that "the invasion of the rights of con-
science is one of the most serious of those defects."1 68 Anthony thus
proposed as follows:
[M]embers of religious denominations conscientiously opposed to the bear-
ing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles
of faith and practice of said religious denomination, may, when drafted into
military service, be considered non-combatants, and shall be assigned by the
Secretary of War to duty in the hospitals, or to the care of freedmen, or
shall pay the sum of $300 to such person as the Secretary of War shall
designate to receive it, to be applied to the benefit of the sick and wounded
soldiers; and such drafted persons shall then be exempt from draft during
the time for which they shall have been drafted.1 69
Some objected that the exemption was too broad and would under-
164 During the War of 1812, a bill was introduced in Congress providing for federal conscription
but was never passed. See R.R. Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the
United States, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 409, 418 (1952).
165 This article will focus on the religious exemptions enacted by the Union during the Civil War
for the obvious reason that many of the same people that voted for these exemptions also voted for,
and in some instances helped frame, the Fourteenth Amendment. The South, however, also ad-
dressed the issue of religious exemptions during the Civil War. Realizing that the forces provided
through state militia and volunteers would be inadequate, in 1862 the Confederate Congress passed a
draft law for the entire Confederacy. Id. at 419 (citing CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, THE
STATUTEs AT LARGE 29 (1861-1864)). The act made no provision for the religiously scrupulous.
An act passed later that same year remedied this deficiency, exempting "[a]ll persons who have been
and are now members of the society of Friends, and the Association of Dunkards, Nazarenes, Men-
nonists in regular membership in their respective denominations: Provided, Members of the Society
of Friends, Nazarenes, Mennonists and Dunkards shall furnish substitutes or pay a tax of five hun-
dred dollars each into the public treasury." Id. (quoting CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, THE
STATUTES AT LARGE 78 (1861-1864)). This provision bad been removed by the end of the War, the
result of growing suspicions about those claiming the exemption. Id. at 419-20. Given the tremen-
dous odds facing the South in terms of manpower, it is testimony to the strength of the claims of
conscience that the exemption was provided at all.
166 See id. at 418.
167 Act of Mar. 3, 1863, cl. 75, 12 Stat. 731.
168 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1864).
169 Id. Anthony's original proposal also exempted ministers of the gospel. Id at 254. This ex-
emption was objected to on several grounds. John Sherman felt it unnecessary-the proposed ex-
emption for individuals would protect those clergy members religiously scrupulous of bearing arms.
Id. James Harlan objected to the exemption on the ground that ministers themselves had not re-
quested it. Id. The special provision for ministers was ultimately removed, and subsequent attempts
to revive it were rejected. Id. at 254, 141 app.
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mine the whole point of the act, which was "to get soldiers." 170 Propo-
nents responded that the exemption would apply only to that narrow
group whose denomination made opposition to arms part of their faith
and creed.1 71 By channeling money to the hospitals, the amendment re-
lieved the religiously scrupulous without "injur[ing] or weaken[ing] the
Government in any respect."' 172
A number of Senators attacked the legitimacy of the religious objec-
tions. Senator Conness, for example, believed that the Friends' historical
opposition to slavery estopped their requests for exemption-this was,
after all, "a Quaker's war."' 173 Similarly, other Senators maintained that
if the religious objection were sincere, it would not be satisfied by the
proposed exemption, which required a payment of a fee to go to the use
of hospitals. There could be no logical distinction between paying money
to the Government to go to hospital services in a time of war and paying
money for the purpose of paying bounties to soldiers-both monies
would normally come out of the same Treasury. 74
The reply, which carried the day, was that religious exemptions
must be seen from the point of view of the individual's conscience, not
what makes sense to the majority:
Gentlemen say [providing that the money go to the use of hospitals] makes
no difference; they are just as much supporting the war in this way as if they
paid the money directly to procure a substitute and place him in the field
with arms in his hands. Perhaps you think so; perhaps I think so; but they
do not; they draw a distinction; and in legislation we must regard as facts
the prejudices and the religious convictions of a people.175
The argument focuses on the conscience of the individual, and in
this it differs tremendously from the traditional approach of the religious
republican. Recall for a moment the crisis facing the Congress: it is hard
to imagine a more sacred duty to a religious republican than the duty to
help preserve the Republic. Significantly, the tension between the needs
of the Union and the claims of conscience was explicitly noted and re-
solved in favor of religious conscience. 176 In providing for the exemption
of those religiously opposed to military service, Congress explicitly rec-
ognized that the claims of conscience could on occasion supersede mere
societal responsibilities. The issue was more than mere paternalistic pro-
170 Id. at 205 (remarks of Mr. Conness).
171 Id. at 206 (remarks of Mr. Wilson).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 205. Conness also claimed no one's Christian salvation could be at issue because "the
shortest and truest way to heaven is to strike a rebel wherever you can reach him." Id.
174 See id. at 206 (remarks of Mr. Powell).
175 Id. at 208 (remarks of Mr. Doolittle).
176 Acknowledging the tension between the teachings of Christ and waging war against the
South, Senator Anthony remarked, "I believe them both, but I cannot reconcile the two together;
and I wish to manifest a respect for the consciences of those who cannot reconcile them and will not
undertake to do so." Id. at 206.
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tection of "sickly sentimentality." 177 Those who truly believed that God
forbade the bearing of arms were answering to a higher law:
Gentlemen may smile when the question is raised as to the exemption
of those men who from conscientious religious convictions cannot take
arms in their hands and go upon the bloody field of conflict; but they do not
understand or they certainly overlook that element in human nature,
stronger than all others, which will take men to the dungeon or to the cross
for their religious convictions. 178
Nor was the issue one of mere political expediency. According to
Thaddeus Stevens, "independent ofpolicy... justice requires [exemption
of the religiously scrupulous.]" 179 In the end, not only was the amend-
ment modified to include non-Christian denominations that conscien-
tiously opposed bearing arms, but the discretionary wording "may" was
replaced with "shall" to make the exemption mandatory.180
This was something new under the sun. For the first time, the na-
tional government mandated a religious exemption from a generally ap-
plicable secular law. Moreover, the law was not based on considerations
of political expediency, but on the demands of higher law: the rights of
conscience.
V. THE SECOND ADOPTION OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wrote against a specific
historical background: (1) Jeffersonian notions of "separate spheres" had
become wholly untenable in light of the clash between religion and gov-
ernment over slavery; (2) Congress had recently recognized the threat to
the rights of conscience arising from the overlapping interests of church
and state; (3) Congress also had recognized that these overlapping inter-
ests may require a religious exemption from an otherwise generally appli-
cable law.
However, even if the general conception of religious liberty had
broadened since the Founding, Barron was still the law of the land. The
177 See id. (remarks of Mr. Conness).
178 Id. at 208 (remarks of Mr. Doolittle).
179 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1262 (1863). Stevens made this statement while calling
(unsuccessfully) for religious exemptions in the previous Congress.
180 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 208 (1864). The amendment in its final form read as
follows:
That members of religious denominations, who shall, by oath or affirmation, declare that they
are conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by
the rules and articles of faith and practice of said religious denominations, shall, when drafted
into the military service, be considered non-combatants, and shall be assigned by the Secretary
of War to duty in the hospitals, or to the care of freedmen, or shall pay the sum of three
hundred dollars to such person as the Secretary of War shall designate to receive it, to be
applied to the benefit of the sick and wounded soldiers; Provided, That no person shall be enti-
tled to the benefit of the provisions of this section unless his declaration of conscientious
scruples against bearing arms shall be supported by satisfactory evidence that his deportment
has been uniformly consistent with such declaration.
Id. at 141 app.
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amendment that would overturn Barron and reconstruct the federalist
structure of the Bill of Rights had yet to be drafted and adopted. When
it was, it incorporated a new declaration of the religious liberty of United
States citizens.
A. Drafting the Fourteenth Amendment
The architects of the Fourteenth Amendment were well aware of
how slavery had resulted in the suppression of religious exercise. John
Bingham, author of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, believed
slavery violated basic principles of the Constitution, including the right
"to utter, according to conscience." 181 James Wilson, Chair of the
House Judiciary Committee and sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
the provisions of which Section One was designed to embrace, noted slav-
ery's "incessant, unrelenting, aggressive warfare upon.., the purity of
religion." 182 Lyman Trumbull, Wilson's cosponsor of the Civil Rights
Act, reminded the Congress of the oppressive laws that existed under
slavery, including provisions which prohibited blacks from "exercising
the function of a minister" and made it "a highly penal offense for any
person ... to teach slaves."' 1 3 Congressman James Ashley noted that
"[slavery] has silenced every free pulpit within its control." 1 4 Accord-
ing to Senator Henry Wilson, "[r]eligion, 'consisting in the performance
of all known duties to God and our fellow men,' never has been and
never will be allowed free exercise in any community where slavery
dwarfs the consciences of men." 18 5 Senator James Nye believed that,
with the fall of slavery, Congress now had the power to protect "freedom
in the exercise of religion."1816 Finally, Congressman Roswell Hart be-
lieved that the rebel states should not be readmitted until they set up a
government where "no law shall be made prohibiting the free exercise of
religion."' 187
The vehicle through which the free exercise of religion would be
181 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (speaking against the admission of Oregon until that
state recognized the equality of blacks); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865), ex-
cerpted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 100 (Va. Comm'n on Constitutional
Gov't ed., 1967) [hereinafter RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES] ("The President, therefore, might well
say, as he does say in his message, 'that the American system rests on the assertion of the equal right
of every man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; to freedom of conscience, to the culture
and exercise of all his faculties.' I propose then, sir .... enforcement, by law, of these 'equal rights of
everyman,' and upon the assertion of which, we are told by the President, the American system
rests.").
182 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199 (1864).
183 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 474 (1865).
184 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1864), excerpted in RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra
note 181, at 81.
185 Id. at 1202.
186 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1073 (1866).
187 Id. at 1629.
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"incorporated" was the Privileges or Immunities Clause.188 Citing Arti-
188 Although the historical grounds for general incorporation of the Bill of Rights have been
debated for years, scholars such as Michael Kent Curtis and Akhil Reed Amar have produced signif-
icant evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to incorporate some or all of
the first eight amendments into the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986); Amar, supra note 23. But cf RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was
meant to be narrow in scope). The reader is referred to these authors for more detailed arguments-
both for and against-a general theory of incorporation.
One argument, however, deserves attention here. Some scholars have maintained that the so-
called Blaine Amendment, which sought to add a provision to the Constitution that would prohibit
the states from an "establishment of religion or prohibition of the free exercise thereof," cuts against
the view that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the First Amendment (or any other provision
in the Bill of Rights for that matter). See Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the
Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 311, 346-47 (1979); Raoul Berger, Incorporation ofthe Bill ofRights in
the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 464-65 (1981); Alfred N.
Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939 (1951); F. William
O'Brien, The Blaine Amendment 1875-76, 41 U. DET. L.J. 137 (1963).
As debated in the Senate, the Blaine Amendment read as follows:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; and no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or
public trust under any State. No public property, and no public revenue of, nor any loan of
credit by or under the authority of, the United States, or any State... shall be appropriated to,
or made or used for, the support of any school, educational or other institution, under the
control of any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or wherein the
particular creed or tenets of any religious or anti-religious sect... shall be taught; and no such
particular creed or tenets shall be read or taught in any school or institution supported in whole
or in part by any such revenue or loan of credit .... This article shall not be construed to
prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution.
4 CONG. REc. 5580 (1875).
According to the amendment's sponsor in the Senate, Fredrick Frelinghuysen, its provisions
were animated by two concerns: protecting religious rights in the states and preventing the use of
public funds for sectarian purposes. 4 CONG. REc. 5561 (1876). According to Senator Morton, the
United States was "a Protestant country," and warned of a "large and growing class of people in this
country who are utterly opposed to our present system of common schools, and who are opposed to
any school that zdoes not teach their religion." Id. at 5585. The Blaine Amendment was, in fact, a
partisan attack on Catholics who had complained about having to pay taxes for schools that taught
out of the Protestant King James Bible. Id. at 5590 (remarks of Senator Bogy). Just to drive this
point home, the amendment contained a caveat preventing it from being interpreted to prohibit the
reading of the (Protestant) Bible in the public schools. Id. at 5580.
In fact, the proposition that states could not establish a religion or prohibit free exercise appar-
ently was uncontroversial. According to the House report, there was considerable disagreement as
to the necessity for any amendment at all. 4 CONG. REC. 5189 (1875). In the Senate debates, states'
rights Democrats loudly proclaimed it was already the case that "no State can pass any law respect-
ing religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id. at 5592 (remarks of Senator Eaton). This is
an extraordinary statement when compared with the Founders' concern that the states be left free to
establish religions. Given the assumed status of "the rights of conscience" that pervades the Blaine
Amendment debates, it appears the Republicans were attempting to use an uncontroversial call to
religious liberty as a means to "bootstrap" in a very sectarian amendment. The demagoguery was
not lost on the Democrats who ridiculed this partisan appeal to Protestant fears of the "Pope of
Rome." Id. at 5589 (remarks of Mr. Stevenson).
There was a telling moment during these debates. Protesting the need for any amendment that
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cle IV, Section 2, of the Constitution,18 9 Henry Wilson listed the free
exercise of religion as one of the "privileges and immunities" violated by
slavery.190 Senator Jacob Howard, discussing the content of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, listed, among
other rights, "the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first
eight amendments to the Constitution."'' 91 As noted previously, Con-
gressman Hart believed that the rebel states should not be readmitted
until they set up a government whose "'citizens shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of other citizens;' where 'no law shall be made
prohibiting the free exercise of religion.' "192 In the Forty-second Con-
gress, Henry L. Dawes declared that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
would force the states to comply with the religion clauses of the First Amendment, Senator Bogy
stood and made the following challenge:
For one hundred years the States have existed; and for all this time they have had the power of
legislation on this subject; and who can rise in this Chamber and say that within that long
period of time any one of them has in any way whatsoever attempted in the most distant man-
ner to trample upon the rights of conscience?
Id. at 5591.
His challenge was met with silence. How was this possible? Frelinghuysen himself had wit-
nessed the Reconstruction debates and heard many in the chamber cite the violations of religious
liberty in the states as one of the reasons for passing the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the silence
is doubly surprising: not only were state violations of religious liberty within the lived memory of
every member of Congress, but pointing out such violations would be in the interest of anyone
seeking to pass the amendment on the floor. Of course, given the sectarian motivations for the
amendment on the floor, it would have been ironic for a Republican to rise and remind Senator Bogy
that some states had recently allowed prejudice and fear to justify trampling upon the religious
conscience of a minority faith.
By appealing to fears about foreigners subverting religious freedom in order to pass a provision
that would have, in effect, constitutionalized the standing of the Protestant Bible, one is reminded of
the Alien and Sedition Acts. There too, appeals were made to fears about foreigners subverting civil
rights in order to pass laws in violation of those very liberties. See Madison, supra note 22, at 139.
The resemblance to the Blaine Amendment increases when one reflects that the Alien and Sedition
Acts, to which Madison was referring, were inspired, at least partly, by anti-Catholicism. See 2
STOKES, supra note 47, at 671. The religious parochialism animating the Blaine Amendment and the
Alien and Sedition Acts (accusations of subversion, refusal to pay taxes, and allegiance to a foreign
King) actually has an ancient and less-than-distinguished heritage. See Luke 23: 1-2.
In short, the episode of the proposed Blaine Amendment is less a refutation of incorporation
than it is an unfortunate instance of religious bigotry.
189 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
190 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864), excerpted in RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES,
supra note 181, at 65. According to Wilson, "[the bitter cruel relentless persecutions of the Method-
ists in the South, almost as void of pity as those which were visited upon the Huguenots in France,
tell how utterly slavery disregards the right to free exercise of religion .... Sir, I might enumerate
many other constitutional rights of the citizen which slavery has disregarded and practically de-
stroyed, but I have enough to illustrate my proposition: that slavery disregards the Supremacy of the
Constitution and denies to the citizen in each State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States." Id.
191 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1865).
192 Id. at 1629.
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had "secured the free exercise of ... religious belief." 193 John Sherman
declared that the "right to worship God according to the dictates of one's
own conscienc is not only a right, but a privilege which in a Christian
country a man ought to enjoy," and that under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."19 4 Finally, the
author of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, John Bingham, declared
that the free exercise of religion was within the "scope and meaning" of
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. 95
But securing free exercise through the Privileges or Immunities
Clause may not be as simple as it looks. As we saw with the Establish-
ment Clause, the very act of incorporation may presuppose a new inter-
pretation of the words. In the case of the Free Exercise Clause, the
manifestly overlapping concerns of religion and government called for a
more sophisticated approach to religious liberty than could be provided
by either separationism or religious republicanism.
B. The Scope of the Second Free Exercise Clause
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment not only signaled their
intent to incorporate the rights of conscience into the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause, but they also provided clues as to the intended scope of
those rights. Specifically, religious exercise was to be protected from
majoritarian hostility or indifference; it was to be a substantive right af-
fording more than simply "equal protection"; and its protection created a
zone of autonomy within which both mandatory and discretionary as-
pects of religious exercise were protected from government interference.
Most importantly, by explicitly targeting "religiously neutral" laws as
examples of what would become unconstitutional with the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, men like John Bingham and Lyman Trumbull
gave notice that in the future, generally applicable laws might sometimes
impermissibly violate an individual's religious liberty.
193 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1871).
194 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1872), excerpted in RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra
note 181, at 615; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871), excerpted in RECONSTRUCTION
DEBATES, supra note 181, at 503 (Congressman Maynard noting that "privileges and immunities"
includes the "personal right" of "freedom... in religion"). The idea that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment incorporated the religion clauses against the states was not unique to Republicans. In the
Forty-second Congress, Democrat John Stockton declared his belief that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "prohibits the states from doing what the Congress was always prohibited from doing," and
cited the First Amendment religion clauses as an example. Id. at 548. In the Forty-third Congress,
Democrat Thomas Norwood expressed his belief that before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "any State may have established a particular religion." Id. at 676. Neither man was contra-
dicted by his colleagues at the time the statements were made.
195 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 app. (1871).
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1. From Federalism to Libertarianism.-At the time of the Found-
ing, "liberty" was largely understood as the "public liberty" of demo-
cratic self-government; majoritarian liberty rather than liberty against
popular majorities. In terms of the First Amendment, the freedoms of
speech and press had been linked to religious freedoms for reasons of
federalism. 196 However, by the 1860s, libertarianism had replaced feder-
alism as the unifying theme of the First Amendment freedoms.1 97 Ac-
cordingly, Jacob Howard described the privileges and immunities to be
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment as including "the personal
rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments to the
Constitution."19 8
The implications for free exercise were significant. It was perfectly
appropriate to expand or contract free exercise under a regime that be-
lieved (1) religion existed to serve the government (religious republican-
ism), and (2) the "liberty" of the Constitution was the "liberty" of
representative government. However, the new Free Exercise Clause be-
longed to the individual, not the majority. As such, no longer was a law
restricting the free exercise of religion prima facie constitutional merely
because it served the needs of the majority. The suppression of religious
exercise by the slaveholding states had forever eliminated that interpreta-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause. But this is simply to assert that the
original prohibitions of the Free Exercise Clause now apply against the
states: no law may be passed that prohibits religion qua religion. There
is evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had a broader
view of the rights of conscience.
2. Protecting Religiously Motivated Conduct.-
Under the Constitution as it is, not as it was, and by force of the fourteenth
amendment, no State hereafter can.., ever repeat the example of Georgia
and send men to the penitentiary, as did that State, for teaching the Indian
to read the lessons of the New Testament .... 199
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood that the free
exercise of religion includes more than the freedom to obey specific doc-
trinal tenets. For example, although John Bingham, Henry Wilson, and
others believed free exercise of religion included freedom to read the Bi-
ble, that activity was not itself held essential to the practice of Christian-
ity. To believe otherwise would disqualify as practicing members the
illiterate and, presumably, the first generation of Christians including the
twelve disciples who had no Bible to read. Certainly, reading the scrip-
tures was understood to be a spiritual activity, and a deeply precious one
196 See supra text accompanying note 16 (discussing the original link between the Tenth and First
Amendments).
197 See Amar, supra note 23, at 1215.
198 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1865) (emphasis added).
199 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 app. (1871) (remarks of John Bingham).
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at that. Nevertheless, if the Free Exercise Clause protects only "conduct
mandated by religious belief,"200 then reading the Bible falls outside the
scope of the Clause.20 1 That this activity was considered one of the rights
of conscience suggests a broader conception of religious freedom. 20 2
In fact, the activities intended to be protected under the incorpo-
rated Free Exercise Clause were vastly different from those anticipated at
the Founding. Although some persisted in limiting the free exercise of
religion to worship,20 3 others declared that religion "consist[s] in the per-
200 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990) (citations
omitted).
201 Put another way, limiting free exercise to actions required or forbidden by one's belief pre-
sumably means there are extra-temporal consequences for engaging, or not engaging, in that activity.
In Christian theology, it makes no difference whether one hears or reads the good news. See Romans
10:9-10, 14 (New International Version) ("[I]f you confess with your mouth, 'Jesus is Lord,' and
believe in your heart that God raised Him from the dead, you will be saved.... And how can they
believe in the one of whom they have not heard? And how can they hear without someone preach-
ing to them?").
202 Another example of this broader view of religious freedom occurred in the debates over
Charles Sumner's civil rights bill, which would have desegregated southern churches. See infra note
213 and accompanying text. Although opponents of Sumner's bill assumed that many white
churches were conscientiously opposed to worshiping with blacks, see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1872), excerpted in RECONSTRUc'rION DEBATES, supra note 181, at 612 (remarks of Matthew
Carpenter), others pointed out that the proposed law would interfere with the newly emancipated
black church. Joshua Hill reminded Congress of the "habitual restraint imposed upon [blacks] by
the presence of white people," and noted that "wherever they have been able by the aid of white
persons, they have established their separate churches, where they hold their separate service and
have their separate minister." Id. at 478. The concern was that Sumner's law could be used by
hostile whites to interfere with black religious worship. According to Matthew Carpenter, the bill
may be made the means of breaking up religious services among the colored people in some
portions of the South where there is an unfriendly feeling towards them. They may have their
churches open only to colored people, and as long as they preserve the peace they are protected
by law in that exclusive worship; but if any white man, no matter what may be his mischievous
purposes and intentions, may go into such churches, I can understand how that would furnish
an opportunity for evil-disposed persons to break up the religious services of the colored people,
and thus inflict upon them a great injury.
Id. at 600; see also id. at 585 (remarks of Frederick Frelinghuysen) ("There is in almost every town
in the land a church where the real estate has been purchased and the building erected from the hard
earnings of colored people, the congregation being composed entirely of colored people, and the
church their property. We do not seek to pass a law that shall divest them of such churches.").
Desegregating the black churches would not have forced an act contrary to faith, nor would it have
prevented an act mandated by religious doctrine. The problem was that the law would have unjusti-
fiably interfered with the right of both black and white congregations to define and pursue their own
religious mission. But see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983) (upholding
on grounds of public policy IRS denial of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory religious pri-
vate school) ("Denial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of
private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from observing their religious tenets.").
203 Frederick Frelinghuysen, for instance, interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to protect only
worship, not "external conduct." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872) ("The words of the
constitutional amendment do not mean that Congress shall pass no law regulating man's external
conduct, for that is morality. The 'exercise of religion' means worship. It can mean nothing else.").
Frelinghuysen based this reading on the Founders' original intentions, thus indicating his belief that
nothing had changed with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In fact, Frelinghuysen
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formance of all known duties to God and our fellow men. ' 204 The rights
of conscience were repeatedly linked with such activities as assisting run-
away slaves, teaching literacy, and engaging in religiously motivated
political discourse.205 To the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment,
freedom of belief included the freedom to act publicly upon that belief.
Reconstructing the rights of conscience to embrace religiously moti-
vated conduct does more than simply expand the definition of legitimate
religious exercise. It evidences a change in the purpose of the Free Exer-
cise Clause. As originally conceived, the religion clauses focused on dis-
criminatory federal legislation; Congress could not pick out one religious
belief for special benefits or particular burdens. Nondiscriminatory laws
which regulated conduct in the public square were a different matter-
this was, after all, the government's turf and no legitimate place for reli-
gion. This view made no sense, however, to those who had witnessed the
intrusive regulation of the southern states and whose own religion was
anything but a private affair. Moved by the events of recent history and
guided by their own interpretation of true religion, the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment turned the focus of the Free Exercise Clause
away from belief20 6 and towards the believer and the impact of generally
applicable law.
3. Beyond Direct Regulation of Religious Exercise.-Southern laws
preventing blacks from reading and writing, as well as those regulating
apparently rejected the idea of incorporation altogether. See 4 CONG. REc. 5561 (1876) (declaring
that the Blaine Amendment "for the first time" made applicable against the states the protections of
the First Amendment religion clauses). In this, Frelinghuysen's views are out of step with the major
players in the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the majority of contemporary legal
commentators. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993) (marshalling the historical evidence of agreement with John Bing-
ham's view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the first eight amendments to the
Constitution).
204 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (remarks of Henry Wilson) (emphasis
added).
205 Thus calling into question Chief Justice Waite's original distinction between religious belief
and religious practice, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879) ("Laws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices."), and Justice Scalia's recent revival of that distinction, see Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). The fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect
religiously based political discourse has particular relevance in the face of modem calls for the
marginalization of religion in the public square. See STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DisBE-
LIEF 55 (1993).
206 On the other hand, the incorporation of the Establishment Clause turns the focus of that
Clause towards belief, as the Supreme Court has long recognized. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (Roberts, J.) ("The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of
religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of
any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to
such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by
law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces
two concepts, -freedom to believe and freedom to act.") (emphasis added).
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black assembly, were all "religiously neutral. '20 7 Generally applicable
laws in the North were targeted as well; for example, laws preventing
anyone from assisting runaway slaves were seen as restrictions on the
rights of conscience that would not be permitted under the Fourteenth
Amendment:
Before [the Fourteenth Amendment,] a State, as in the case of the State of
Illinois, could make it a crime punishable by fine and imprisonment for any
citizen within her limits, in obedience to the injunction of our divine
Master, to help a slave who was ready to perish; to give him shelter, or
break with him his crust of bread.208
An obvious objection here might be that even though religion-neu-
tral laws were cited as violations of free exercise, the Free Exercise
Clause itself need not have been expanded to prevent these kinds of
abridgments. For example, laws attempting to regulate black education
or assembly could presumably have been struck down under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause or by way of an incorpo-
rated Free Speech Clause. Put another way, could not all the violations
by the South have been cured by requiring government to remain "scru-
pulously" neutral in regard to religion and trust that other constitutional
provisions would sufficiently guard against indirect burdens without
needing to expand the reach of the Free Exercise Clause?20 9
207 Recall that poor Mrs. Douglas, imprisoned for teaching blacks how to read, was convicted for
unlawful assembly. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
208 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 app. (1871) (remarks of John Bingham). Bingham
goes on: "The validity of that State restriction upon the rights of conscience and the duty of life was
affirmed, to the shame and disgrace of America, in the Supreme Court of the United States; but
nevertheless affirmed in obedience to the requirements of the Constitution." Id. Aiders and abettors
of fugitives were often exonerated by juries when prosecuted in federal courts. See, eg., Vaughn v.
Williams, 28 F. Cas. 1115 (D. Ind. 1845) (No. 16,903); see also Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh
Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33. In fact, federal judges were
careful to admonish juries that defendants could not be acquitted simply on the ground that their
actions were justified by the "rights of conscience." See Van Metre v. Mitchell, 28 F. Cas. 1036,
1041 (W.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 16,865) (Justice Grier instructing jury that "[s]ome men of disordered
understanding or perverted conscience may conceive it a religious duty to break the law, but the law
will not tolerate their excuse.... He is on trial for his acts: and if his opinions, ceasing to be
speculative, have ended in conduct, let no morbid sympathy-no false respect for pretended 'rights
of conscience'-prevent either court or jury from judging him justly, without favour as without
fear."); Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1040, 1045 (D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7501) (charging jury that
"much has been said of the laws of nature, of conscience, and of the rights of conscience. This
monitor, under great excitement, may mislead, and always does mislead, when it urges any one to
violate the law."). The cases are doubly significant in that they both indicate the claim was being
made and that the claim, by Bingham at least, was expected to be vindicated with the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But see United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989), cert de-
nied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) (upholding convictions of defendants involved in religious sanctuary
movement).
209 See Philip Kurland, Of Church State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 96 (1961)
(interpreting the religion clauses as "prohibit[ing] classification in terms of religion either to confer a
benefit or to impose a burden"); see also Mark Tushnet, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court:
Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. Cr. REv. 373. Professor Laycock calls this "formal neutrality." See
1153
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Undoubtedly, such laws are prohibited by other clauses in the Con-
stitution. The question is whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment believed that the Free Exercise Clause would independently protect
future United States citizens from similar invasions of their "privileges or
immunities." Did Wilson, Bingham, Trumbull, and Nye talk the talk of
free speech and equal protection, or the "rights of conscience?"
Even the most cursory review of the debates criticizing southern
prohibitions of assembly and education of blacks reveals that the con-
cerns were at least as spiritual as they were political. To Henry Wilson,
withholding the Bible violated Free Exercise in that it forced Christianity
to surrender "the choicest jewel of its faith. ' 210 These laws were not
mere political handicaps, but prevented the proclamation of the "new
evangel, 'The pure in heart shall see God,' "211 and forced those under
their rule to "die without hope. ' 212 The problem with a law preventing
someone from learning to read was not that others were allowed to read,
nor was it simply a matter of violating the individual's right to "utter,
according to conscience." The problem was that Christians could not
preach, and slaves could not hear, the Good News-to the endangerment
of the slaves' eternal souls.
In fact, when Reconstruction legislation attempting to effect the
goal of equality came into conflict with free exercise principles, free exer-
cise won the day. In 1870, Charles Sumner introduced a Civil Rights
Bill that provided:
That no citizen of the United States shall, by any reason of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude, be excepted or excluded from the full and
equal enjoyment of any accommodation, advantage, facility, or privilege
furnished by innkeepers ... by trustees and officers of church organizations,
cemetery associations, and benevolent institutions incorporated by national
or State authority.213
Although some decried the potential for "mixing the races, ' '214
others challenged the proposed amendment as an indirect abridgment of
the rights of conscience. Matthew Carpenter, for example, cited the reli-
gion clauses of the First Amendment and noted that "[w]ithout discuss-
ing very minutely whether it does or does not violate the letter of the
Constitution, I think it is in violation of the spirit of the Constitution in
that it disregards the opinions and the motives of those who framed the
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL
L. REv. 993 (1990).
210 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1859) (remarks of Henry Wilson).
211 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 app. (1871) (remarks of John Bingham).
212 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1865) (remarks of John Bingham).
213 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1872), excerpted in RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra
note 181, at 600 (emphasis added) (ellipsis in original). After it had been buried for more than a year
by the Judiciary Committee, Sumner attempted to add the bill as an amendment to the proposed
amnesty bill. See id. at 575.
214 See id. at 608 (remarks of Thomas Norwood).
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Constitution, and is in conflict with what they believed they had se-
cured.... [I]t cannot be doubted that they... intended to, and thought
they had, carefully excluded the whole subject of religion from federal
control or interference. ' 215
Carpenter was concerned with the law's effect: interference with the
rights of conscience. As we have seen, however, the original Free Exer-
cise Clause served only as a statement of nonenumeration-Congress had
no power over religion qua religion, but had significant power to interfere
with religious exercise indirectly through other enumerated powers.
Sumner, holding to the Tenth Amendment reading of the Free Exercise
Clause, saw his advantage and pressed it:
The Constitution forbids all interference with religion. It does not forbid
all effort to carry out the primal principles of republican institutions. Now,
sir, here is no interference with religion.... There is simply the assertion of
a political rule, or, if you please, a rule of political conduct.216
To those who believed in the rights of conscience, however, the fact
that it was a political law which interfered with the rights of conscience
was irrelevant. According to Senator Henry Anthony:
I am very anxious indeed to vote to give to the colored people all their legal
rights, but I shall not vote to give any person any religious rights, or to take
from any person any religious rights. If there are white men so foolish as to
believe that it is not right for negroes to worship with them, I pity them, but
I shall not vote to deprive them of their undoubted right to worship so....
I shall not vote for any bill that contains any provision which interferes
with religious worship, even if it compels me to vote against the amnesty
bill, which I should regret very much.217
In the end, the church provision was removed and the remainder of
Sumner's bill was passed. 218
The church-regulation debate, as well as the debates surrounding
215 Id. at 600.
216 Id. at 611; see also LOCKE, supra note 32, at 86-87 (laws may not regulate religion as religion,
but the state may make laws affecting religious conduct as a "political matter"). Interestingly, Sum-
ner's arguments presage many of the modem free exercise issues. For example, Sumner states:
[W]e have no right to enter the church and interfere in any way with its religious ordinances, as
with the raising of the Host... but when a church organization asks the benefit of the law by an
act of incorporation, it must submit to the great primal law of the Union-the Constitution of
the United States interpreted by the Declaration of Independence .... Whenever a church
organization seeks incorporation it must submit to the great political law of the land. It can
have the aid it seeks only by submitting to this political law ... the law of justice, the law of
equal rights.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1872), excerpted in RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note
181, at 611. The modem counterpart would be conditioning aid or tax exemptions on the relinquish-
ment of a religious belief. See Michael McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Impli-
cations for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1989).
217 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1872), excerpted in RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra
note 181, at 610. It was Anthony who believed that the rights of conscience required an exemption
from the Union Army. See supra text accompanying note 168.
218 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1877: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 533
(1988).
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the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, indicate that many in Con-
gress believed there existed a higher authority that constrained the legiti-
mate reach of secular law. Although the laws passed by the southern
states could today be struck down on a variety of grounds, to deny the
modern Free Exercise Clause independent "bite" is to ignore the priori-
ties of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and place a secular
reading on what was for many, after all, the culmination of a religious
movement.219
CONCLUSION: RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Whatever distinctions were drawn before the adoption of the recent amend-
ments, here is the last voice of the public will, which we are bound to obey,
which declares that every man shall have the protection of this immunity
and privilege. 220
The First Amendment does not read today as it did when it was
ratified in 1791. A jurisprudence of religious liberty that relies solely on
the intentions of the Founders may correctly interpret their Free Exercise
Clause, but not our Free Exercise Clause. It gets the wrong history right.
The historical record indicates that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment believed that the free exercise of religion was a privilege or
immunity of citizens of the United States. However, the mid-nineteenth-
century interpretation of free exercise was radically different from that of
the Founders. Contrary to the expectations of the separationists, by the
time of Reconstruction the nation had experienced decades of clashes
resulting from the overlapping concerns of religion and government.
Although religion was once expected to defer to the majority, the sup-
pression of slave religion called into question the government's power to
interfere, even indirectly, with legitimate religious exercise. Accordingly,
the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated a broader conception
of religious liberty than that intended in 1791. The Clause thus effected a
modification of the original "rights of conscience."
To those who would give effect to the constitutional movements of
the People since the Founding, the religion clauses must be read accord-
ing to the intentions of those who fought a war over slavery and amended
their Constitution to incorporate the lessons of that conflict. Under the
amended Free Exercise Clause, religious minorities can invoke the origi-
nal intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and claim a reli-
gious liberty that requires exemption from the unjustified impact of
generally applicable law.
219 See Smith, supra note 34 (noting the paradoxes that arise when the religiously justified religion
clauses are interpreted according to a secular world view).
220 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1872), excerpted in RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra
note 181, at 615 (remarks of John Sherman).
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